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Introduction
1
Introduction
Think of the last time you said something. In all likelihood you were talking to someone rather 
than muttering words to yourself. Whether you are gossiping, ordering a beer at a bar or 
teaching a class, the act of speaking typically involves a speaker and at least one addressee. 
It is therefore unsurprising that the communicative context in which we speak affects 
the way we speak. Our language system is very flexible in this respect, allowing speakers 
to adapt their language use depending who they are talking to, why they are talking and 
what they are talking about. For instance, if we discuss the topic of this thesis, I will adjust 
what I tell you and how I formulate it depending on what I know about you. If you do not 
speak Dutch, I will address you in English. If you are an expert in the field, I can use jargon. 
If we have talked about this research before, I may refer to our previous interactions. Thus, 
seemingly effortlessly, we can shape the language we speak to serve our and other people’s 
communicative needs and goals. 
This thesis consists of a series of experiments that investigate the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms that allow us to adapt our language use to the communicative context in which 
we find ourselves. In these experiments, I compare language production in communicative 
and non-communicative situations, as well as in situations in which speakers need to adjust 
their language use based on what information they do or do not share with their interlocutor. 
Language and communication
Given that we primarily use language to communicate, it is unsurprising that both language 
production and comprehension are shaped by communicative and social factors. A clear 
example of this is recipient design or audience design (Clark & Murphy, 1982; Sacks, Schegloff, & 
Jefferson, 1974), which refers to speakers’ ability to tailor utterances so particular addressees 
can understand them. For example, you would probably not speak in the same way to a child 
as compared to an adult. Research has shown that speakers adapt their language use based 
on what they know about their addressee in a variety of ways (see e.g., Brennan, Galati, & 
Kuhlen, 2010 for an overview). For instance, speakers include less detail, use fewer words 
and produce less intelligible speech when retelling a story to an old compared to a new 
addressee (Galati & Brennan, 2010), and even four-year-old children produce shorter and 
simpler utterances when talking to a younger child compared to an adult (Shatz & Gelman, 
1973). 
In order to successfully tailor their language use to their audience, speakers need to take into 
account common ground, i.e. the beliefs, assumptions and knowledge they share with their 
interlocutors (Clark & Carlson, 1982; Clark & Marshall, 1981). Information that is only available 
to the speaker is referred to as privileged ground information. There has been considerable 
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debate in the literature about the extent and the way in which speakers take the distinction 
between common ground and privileged ground into account when designing utterances. 
Some theories assume that common ground is essential for efficient communication and 
that interlocutors continuously update their common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark 
& Carlson, 1982; Clark & Krych, 2004). According to Constraint-Based Processing models, 
speakers keep their addressee in mind from the earliest stages of utterance planning in a 
probabilistic, constraint-based way, resulting in early effects of common ground (Brennan 
& Hanna, 2009; Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003; Horton & Gerrig, 2002; Tanenhaus & 
Trueswell, 1995). In contrast, the Monitoring and Adjustment theory proposes that keeping 
track of the distinction between shared and privileged information during utterance 
planning is resource-intensive and often not necessary (Horton & Keysar, 1996). According 
to this view, speakers initially design their utterances from their own egocentric perspective, 
and common ground only comes into play at a later stage when speakers monitor their 
utterance (Keysar, Barr & Horton, 1998). In chapters two and three of this thesis, I investigate 
how and when common and privileged ground information affect speech planning.
Conversational partners keep track of moment-to-moment changes in common ground 
through a process known as grounding, i.e. they seek and give evidence that what has been 
said has been understood and thus make it part of their common ground (Clark, 1996; Clark 
& Brennan, 1991; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). For example, when a speaker introduces a 
new referring expression into a conversation (e.g., did you see that car?), the addressee can 
respond by accepting the expression (“yes”), modifying it (“the red car?”), or asking for a 
different conceptualization (“what car?”; Clark & Brennan, 1991). Once interlocutors have 
found and agreed on a shared perspective, they have established a conceptual pact, i.e. a 
flexible, temporary agreement about how a referent is conceptualized (Brennan & Clark, 
1996). Interlocutors are likely to reuse conceptual pacts in later references.
There is evidence that conceptual pacts are partner-specific. For example, speakers 
reconceptualize conceptual pacts when switching conversational partners (e.g., Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Horton & Gerrig, 2005), and listeners are slowed down in their interpretation 
when speakers break a previously established conceptual pact (Metzing & Brennan, 2003). 
However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms that bring about such partner-specific 
effects are still poorly understood. Clark & Marshall (1978; 1981) proposed that interlocutors 
encode triple co-presence of speaker, addressee and referent in specialized reference diaries. 
However, Horton & Gerrig (2005, 2016) pointed out that routinely making inferences about 
triple co-presence is too computationally costly to be plausible. Instead, they proposed that 
domain-general episodic memory processes support the emergence of partner-specific 
effects (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton, 2007). In this view, conversational partners create rich 
episodic memory traces of their interactions, thus linking interlocutors, content and context 
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in memory. The presence of an interlocutor can then lead to the automatic retrieval of related 
information, including previously established conceptual pacts. This association-based view 
requires neither explicit tagging of common ground, nor specialized memory processes 
(Horton & Brennan, 2016). In the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis, I investigate how 
conceptual pacts are established and retrieved from memory.  
The neurobiology of communication
Although we usually speak in social and communicative contexts, the neurobiology of 
speaking, and language processing in general, has typically been studied in isolation. For 
example, participants in these experiments may be instructed to read or listen to words or 
sentences, or to name pictures in settings stripped of any communicative or social context. 
One obvious reason for this is that it is hard to study social and communicative language 
use in the lab (see the notes on methods below). Yet, by ignoring the communicative and 
social context in which we use language, we risk missing out on key aspects of everyday, 
naturalistic language processing. In recent years, researchers have therefore started to 
investigate the neural mechanisms supporting the production and comprehension of 
communicative actions and language. 
Neuroimaging studies on communication have studied a wide variety of verbal and non-
verbal behaviors, including pointing, iconic gestures, language and the development 
of novel communication systems. Research on communicative action planning has 
consistently found that the right superior temporal sulcus is more activated when planning 
a communicative as compared to a non-communicative action. For example, the superior 
temporal sulcus is involved when planning a novel communicative action as compared to 
an instrumental action (Noordzij et al., 2009), and during communicative pointing relative to 
non-communicative pointing (Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011). Furthermore, repetitive TMS 
to this brain region impairs communicators’ ability to improve their task efficiency over the 
course of a series of communicative interactions (Stolk et al., 2014). 
The superior temporal sulcus also plays an important role in the comprehension of 
communicative actions. For example, Noordzij et al. (2009) showed that the right 
posterior superior temporal sulcus is involved in both the planning and the recognition of 
communicative actions, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus is more activated while 
observing communicative, participant-directed gestures relative to non-communicative 
actions (Redcay, Velnoskey, & Rowe, 2016). Similarly, seeing someone shift their eye gaze 
towards you, a powerful way to initiate communication, has also been found to selectively 
engage the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (Ethofer, Gschwind, & Vuilleumier 
2011; Redcay et al., 2010; Redcay, Ludlum, Velnoskey, & Simren, 2015). However, a number 
of studies have also found activations in a more distributed network of brain regions, 
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including key areas involved in mentalizing and theory of mind (see box 1). For example, 
the comparison between observing actions with a communicative intent as compared to 
a private intent revealed activations in the medial prefrontal cortex (Walter et al., 2004; 
Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014), temporoparietal 
junction (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Ciaramidaro et al., 2014) and the precuneus (Ciaramidaro 
et al., 2007). Similarly, establishing joint attention through eye gaze has also been found 
to activate the medial prefrontal cortex (Kampe, Frith, & Frith, 2003; Schilbach et al., 2010), 
the temporoparietal junction (Caruana, Brock, & Woolgar, 2015; Redcay et al., 2010) and the 
precuneus (Caruana et al., 2015). 
A similar picture emerges from the literature on communicative language processing. 
Relatively few neuroimaging studies have manipulated communicative intent in a language 
production paradigm. Sassa et al. (2007) found that the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral 
superior temporal sulcus and the left temporoparietal junction were more activated while 
speakers were talking to an actor relative to describing a situation. Willems et al. (2010) 
independently manipulated communicative intent and linguistic difficulty in a language 
production task. They found that the medial prefrontal cortex is sensitive to communicative 
intent, regardless of linguistic difficulty. The medial prefrontal cortex also appears to play an 
important role in the comprehension of communicative speech. For instance, the medial 
prefrontal cortex and bilateral temporal poles are more activated when someone hears their 
own name as compared to someone else’s name (Kampe et al., 2003), and in a communication 
task in which participants followed spoken instructions, the mere presence of a director 
resulted in increased activity in a number of brain regions, including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, bilateral superior temporal sulcus, middle temporal sulci and the extrastriate body 
area (Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). 
Research on communication has not only looked at what happens in the brain of individual 
communicators. Recent years have seen an increased interest in brain-to-brain coupling 
during communication. For example, Stephens, Silbert , & Hasson (2010) scanned a speaker 
while she told an autobiographical story in the MRI scanner. They then scanned a group 
of listeners while they listened to this narrative, and calculated inter-subject correlations 
between the speaker’s and the listeners’ fMRI data. They found that neural activity in 
speakers and listeners’ brains is spatially and temporally coupled. Later studies using 
similar paradigms have provided additional evidence for extensive inter-individual neural 
synchronization during communication (Silbert, Honey, Simony, Poeppel, & Hasson, 2014; 
Spiegelhalder et al., 2014).  
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Some notes on methods
It is challenging to study communicative language processing in the lab. The quintessential 
context in which people speak and listen, dialog, is interactive, free-flowing, self-generated 
and multimodal. These characteristics pose serious challenges for researchers studying 
communicative language processing. On the one hand, you aim to achieve ecological 
validity, making sure that you do not lose the key features and complexity inherent to 
conversation. On the other hand, you need to find ways to measure and quantify the aspect 
of communicative language processing you are interested in. This involves imposing a 
certain level of experimental control over the interaction, and often requires repetitions of 
the phenomenon of interest over the course of the experiment. In order to balance these 
opposing forces, researchers inevitably have to compromise (Kuhlen, Allefeld, Anders, & 
Haynes, 2015). A wide variety of solutions has been developed, including imposing task 
structure on the interaction by using referential communication games, using prerecorded 
naturalistic stimuli, limiting communicative means and using confederates instead of naive 
participants (Kuhlen et al., 2015). 
Neuroimaging studies of communicative language production face additional challenges 
(Kuhlen et al., 2015). One of the challenges of fMRI is the low temporal resolution of the 
method (see Box 3), which makes it difficult to tease apart the neural response to events that 
BOX 1.1: Mentalizing 
Mentalizing refers to people’s ability to mentally put themselves in other people’s shoes, 
i.e. tracking and understanding what other people think or feel. This process can be both 
explicit and implicit (Frith & Frith, 2012). The terms mentalizing and theory of mind are 
often used interchangeably, although theory of mind suggests a more conscious process 
(Frith & Frith, 2012). There is considerable debate about how and when children’s theory 
of mind skills develop, as well as about whether this skill is uniquely human (Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005).
The ability to track another person’s beliefs and intentions has been tested using a 
variety of tasks, including by asking participants to judge false belief stories, to answer 
questions about social animations and to view photographs of eyes (Schurz, Radua, 
Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Neuroimaging studies of 
mentalizing have consistently found increased activity in a series of brain regions that 
include the medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junctions and precuneus (Amodio 
& Frith, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
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occur close in time. This constraint typically requires social interactions in the scanner to be 
broken down into distinguishable events, thus restricting the interactive and free-flowing 
nature of the interactions. Another challenge for fMRI experiments on communication is that 
speaking in the scanner can introduce various stimulus-correlated artifacts. Head motion 
in particular can cause poor realignment of the functional images. In addition, stimulus-
correlated breathing can cause artifacts in the fMRI data during speaking (Farthing et al., 
2007). Finally, a straightforward limitation of using fMRI for research on communication is 
that in-person face-to-face verbal interactions are impossible when one of the interlocutors 
lies in a dark and noisy MRI scanner.
In sum, studying communicative language production using fMRI requires researchers to find 
an optimal balance between experimental control and ecological validity, while considering 
the limitations of fMRI. One of the main decisions I made for the experiments in this thesis 
is to test pairs of naïve participants, because confederates can affect the naturalness of 
the interaction (see Kuhlen & Brennan, 2012 for a more detailed discussion of the use of 
confederates). In addition, I imposed a number of constrains on the experimental tasks I 
used to achieve an optimal level of experimental control, for example, by only allowing one-
directional communication (chapters 2 and 3), restricting free-flowing interactions to a pre-
scanning session (chapter 4), or limiting participants’ communicative means (chapter 5).
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BOX 1.2: Eye-tracking and visual world paradigms
Moving your eyes allows you to see part of the visual world around you in fine detail. 
Most of the time, the part of the world you are looking at is also the part you are focusing 
your attention on. Eye-tracking thus provides a measure of visual attention, and has 
been widely used to study visual perception, reading and language processing. Cooper 
(1974) was the first to find a systematic relationship between eye movements and speech 
processing. He showed that listeners tend to spontaneously look at pictures that are 
semantically related to the spoken narratives they hear and that listeners’ eye movements 
to these semantically related pictures are closely time-locked to the spoken narratives. 
The time-locked relationship between speech processing and visual attention later 
formed the basis for visual world paradigms (Huettig, Rommers, & Meyer, 2011). In 
these paradigms, participants typically listen to prerecorded speech while viewing an 
experimental display containing a set of objects or words or a picture of a scene. The 
speech often contains words that are phonologically, semantically or visually related to 
the words or pictures in the display, allowing researchers to study how different types 
of linguistic information are integrated with the visual environment. In a line of similar 
production research, participants are asked to describe scenes or sets of objects while 
their eye gaze is tracked. This paradigm allows researchers to investigate how speakers 
generate utterance plans and coordinate planning and articulation (Huettig et al. 2011). 
More recently, both these production and comprehension paradigms have been adapted 
to study the role of common ground in interactive language processing (e.g., Hanna, 
Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Brown-Schmidt & 
Tanenhaus, 2008). In these studies, participants often see an array containing objects, some 
of which are occluded from their interlocutor’s point of view. Participants are instructed 
to produce a sentence or to listen to a sentence about one of the objects in the array. 
On critical trials, they need to consider the distinction between common and privileged 
information in order to correctly interpret or unambiguously describe the target object. 
The high temporal resolution of eye-tracking makes it a very suitable and relatively 
unobtrusive method to study when common ground influences language processing.
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BOX 1.3: fMRI 
The main method used in this thesis is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
which measures the Blood Oxygenation Dependent (BOLD) signal. The BOLD signal 
is measured while people perform a cognitive task in the MRI scanner. When there is 
increased neuronal activity in a brain area in response to the task, this brain area will 
consume more oxygen and will receive an influx of oxygenated blood to compensate 
for the increased oxygen consumption. These changes in the blood oxygenation 
level can be measured using fMRI, as oxygen-rich blood and oxygen-poor blood have 
different magnetic properties. fMRI is therefore an indirect measure of brain activity: 
we measure hemodynamic changes in response to neuronal activity rather than the 
neuronal activity itself. The blood flow changes occur several seconds after the onset of 
neuronal activity. The BOLD signal therefore always lags behind on the actual neuronal 
activity, as shown in Figure 1.1B. For this reason, the temporal resolution of fMRI is in 
the order of seconds, making it unsuitable to answer questions about the exact timing 
of cognitive processes. However, the spatial resolution of the technique is very good, 
making fMRI an excellent and non-invasive technique to localize the brain areas that are 
involved in specific cognitive functions.
Figure 1.1: An MRI scanner (A) and the BOLD response (B). The BOLD response only peaks 4-8 seconds 
after stimulus onset, giving the method poor temporal resolution.
Time
BO
LD
 s
ig
na
l i
nt
en
si
ty
Stimulus
onset
Peak 4-8 s after
stimulus onset
BA
Vanlangendonck.indd   18 16-2-2017   15:04:30
19
Introduction
1
Objectives and outline of the thesis
The overarching goal of this thesis is to investigate the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying communicative language production. The first objective is to investigate 
when and how common and privileged ground information affect speech planning 
in a moment-to-moment fashion. The second objective is to study how the process of 
grounding affects the neural representations of jointly established linguistic labels. Most 
of the existing neuroimaging research on communication has compared communicative 
and non-communicative settings without considering the more fine-grained distinctions 
and processes identified in the psycholinguistic literature on this topic. In this thesis, I 
therefore also aim to link these two lines of literature by combining existing psycholinguistic 
paradigms with eye-tracking and fMRI.
In chapter 2, I investigated how and when common ground affects speech planning by 
tracking speakers’ eye movements while they played a referential communication game. 
In chapter 3, I used a similar paradigm in an fMRI experiment in which I manipulated 
whether speakers had to distinguish between common and privileged ground in order to 
communicate efficiently with an addressee, in addition to comparing language production 
in a communicative and a non-communicative context. Chapter 4 shifts the focus to the role 
of communication and collaboration in memory encoding and retrieval. In this experiment, 
participants learned labels in collaborative and individual contexts and later retrieved these 
labels in the MRI scanner. In chapter 5, I followed up on this study by investigating how the 
process of coordinating meaning shapes the neural representations of jointly established 
linguistic labels. Finally, in chapter 6, I discuss the findings of this thesis in relation to the 
existing literature and highlight interesting avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Abstract
In order to communicate successfully, speakers have to take into account which information 
they share with their addressee, i.e. common ground. In the current experiment we 
investigated how and when common ground affects speech planning by tracking speakers’ 
eye movements while they played a referential communication game. We found evidence 
that common ground exerts an early, but incomplete effect on speech planning. In addition, 
we did not find longer planning times when speakers had to take common ground into 
account, suggesting that taking common ground into account is not necessarily an effortful 
process. Common ground information thus appears to act as a partial constraint on language 
production that is integrated flexibly and efficiently in the speech planning process.
Based on:  
Vanlangendonck, F., Willems, R. M., Menenti, L., & Hagoort, P. (2016). An early influence of 
common ground during speech planning. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 31(6), 
741-750.
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Introduction
A key question in language production is when and how speakers take into account which 
knowledge is shared between speaker and addressee (common ground) and which information 
is only available to the speaker (privileged ground) (Clark & Marshall, 1978). According to Grice’s 
Maxim of Quantity, speakers should make their contributions as informative as is required for 
the current purpose of an interaction (Grice, 1975). Information that is not shared between 
interlocutors and that is uninformative should therefore not influence the language production 
process. However, speakers do not always successfully ignore privileged information. Imagine 
a situation in which a speaker sees two bottles of different sizes, the smallest of which is 
occluded from their addressee’s point of view. If the speaker asks the addressee to hand him 
the mutually visible bottle, he can either describe it using a size adjective (the large bottle) 
or a bare noun (the bottle). According to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, the speaker should not 
use a size-contrasting adjective, because the smaller bottle is occluded from the listener’s 
point of view. However, speakers in this situation regularly use a size adjective (Horton & 
Keysar, 1996; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Yoon, Koh & Brown-Schmidt, 2012). In this case, 
an overspecification does not prevent the listener from identifying the intended referent. 
However, speakers also overspecify referring expressions when an overspecified expression 
can cause a misunderstanding (Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008), and when they are instructed 
to conceal privileged information (Wardlow Lane, Groisman & Ferreira, 2006).
The question why speakers fail to completely ignore privileged information is still under 
debate, and two main theories have emerged to explain these results. According to 
Constraint-Based Processing models, speakers keep their addressee in mind from the earliest 
stages of utterance planning in a probabilistic, constraint-based way, resulting in early 
effects of common ground (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003; 
Horton & Gerrig, 2002; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995). In this view, privileged and common 
ground information act as partial constraints for language processing. When privileged 
information is salient, as in the example with the additional bottle above, speakers may 
fail to ignore it. In contrast, the Monitoring and Adjustment theory proposes that keeping 
track of the distinction between shared and privileged information during utterance 
planning is resource-intensive and often not necessary (Horton & Keysar, 1996). According 
to this view, speakers initially design their utterances from their own egocentric perspective, 
and common ground only comes into play at a later stage when speakers monitor their 
utterance (Keysar, Barr & Horton, 1998). This model thus predicts that speakers initially do 
not distinguish between privileged and common ground information during utterance 
planning. Monitoring and adjusting the initial utterance plan is considered effortful and 
requires additional planning time (Horton & Keysar, 1996). In this view, speakers fail to ignore 
privileged information when their initial egocentric plan is not corrected. 
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In the current experiment, we investigated when and how shared and privileged visual 
information affect the production of referring expressions. Both the Constraint-Based 
Processing models and the Monitoring and Adjustment theory predict that privileged 
information can affect the production of referring expressions, but they make different 
predictions about when speakers take into account the distinction between shared and 
privileged ground. Constraint-Based Processing Models predict early effects of common 
ground, although privileged information may not always be successfully ignored. The 
Monitoring and Adjustment theory predicts effects of common ground only after an initial 
egocentric planning stage. Previous studies have mostly focused on speakers’ adjective use. 
In the current experiment, we also measured eye-tracking data and planning durations in 
order to gain more insight into the timing of the underlying processes. We used the high 
temporal resolution of eye-tracking to test whether speakers distinguish between shared 
and privileged information during the early stages of planning a referring expression. 
In addition, we investigated whether ignoring privileged information during language 
production is resource-intensive as predicted by the Monitoring and Adjustment model 
by measuring speech planning durations. If speakers monitor and adapt their initial 
egocentric utterance plans when they design referring expressions that take into account 
their addressee’s perspective, this should result in longer planning durations. Finally, we 
were interested in whether speakers avoid egocentric descriptions when those threaten 
communicative success. We therefore introduced two types of conditions. In the advisable 
audience design condition, a failure to ignore privileged information was overinformative, 
but the intended referent was clear. In the obligatory audience design condition, failing 
to ignore privileged information made it impossible for the listener to infer the intended 
referent. This condition, used here for the first time, thus provides a stronger test for speakers’ 
sensitivity to communicative success than the advisable audience design condition. 
Method
Participants
22 pairs of native Dutch speakers played a computerised version of a referential 
communication game (Keysar, Barr, Balin & Brauner, 2000; Yoon, Koh & Brown-Schmidt, 
2012). Participants did not know each other before the start of the experiment. Data from 
one pair were excluded from the analyses due to experimenter error, and data from another 
pair were excluded because the speaker’s responses could not be coded. The remaining 
participants consisted of 6 men and 34 women (mean age: 21.5 years, range 18-29). Half of 
the eye-tracking data from one pair were lost due to equipment malfunction. The remaining 
eye-tracking data from this pair were included in the final dataset.
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Procedure
A coin toss was used to randomly assign participants to the roles of speaker and listener for 
the duration of the experiment. The speaker and listener were seated at separate monitors, 
separated by a screen to prevent them from seeing each other’s monitor. Throughout the 
experiment, participants saw opposite sides of a 4 x 4 array containing objects of different 
sizes (Figure 2.1). Each array contained 3 closed slots on each player’s side, allowing us to 
manipulate which objects were in common ground (i.e. visible to both participants). 
Participants completed 288 trials in total. On each trial, the speaker described a specific 
object in the array in a way that would allow the listener to select the correct object from 
the array. During the first phase of the trial (3000 ms), the speaker and listener each saw 
their side of the array. Then the speaker was cued by means of a red circle around one of 
the objects, and described this object for the addressee (Figure 2.2). On the basis of the 
speaker’s description, the listener selected an object by means of a mouse click. The cued 
object was always mutually visible. Speakers were instructed not to use descriptions 
referring to the position of the object in the array, such as ‘upper left corner’ or ‘rightmost’. 
Participants successfully refrained from using such spatial descriptions (see results section). 
In addition, they were instructed not to ask questions or give each other feedback during the 
experiment. Speakers were not given any on-screen or verbal feedback about the listener’s 
performance during the experiment. Participants were seated next to each other in the lab, 
so speakers could occasionally hear the listeners’ mouse clicks.
Figure 2.1: Overview of the set-up. Speakers and listeners viewed opposite sides of 4 x 4 arrays containing 
objects. Some objects were only visible to one of the participants, allowing us to manipulate which objects 
were in common ground. Speakers’ responses and eye movements were recorded.
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Before starting the experiment, participants practised the task together using a real array 
and real objects. They jointly placed the objects in the array, viewed each other’s perspective, 
and performed the task. Then participants practised the task on the computer; during part 
of these test trials they were allowed to see both monitors and they could give feedback to 
each other. 
Figure 2.2: Trial sequence from the speaker’s and the listener’s point of view. In the first phase of each 
trial, speakers and listeners each viewed their side of the array. In the second phase of the trial, the speaker 
described the object that was indicated with a red circle, and the listener selected an object using the cursor.
Speakers’ descriptions were recorded and their eye movements were tracked using a head-
mounted EyeLink II eye-tracker (SR Research) with a 250 Hz sampling frequency. We tracked 
both pupil and corneal reflection whenever possible. The distance between the speaker 
and the monitor was approximately 57 cm. We calibrated the eye-tracker at the start of the 
experiment, after a break halfway through the experiment and whenever deemed necessary. 
Drift correction was performed before each trial.
Materials
We manipulated the number, size and visibility of the relevant objects to create 6 conditions 
(Figure 2.3). In the audience design conditions (left column Figure 2.3), speakers saw an 
extra competitor object that the listener could not see. In the obligatory audience design 
condition, speakers saw 3 relevant identical objects of different sizes: one target object, one 
occluded competitor object and one mutually visible object. The target object was always 
the medium-sized object of the 3 objects. If speakers described this object from their own 
perspective, they would call it the medium object. In this case, their addressee had a 50 per 
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cent chance of selecting the wrong object. On the other hand, if speakers considered the 
perspective of their addressee, they would ignore the occluded object and call the medium-
sized object small or large. In the advisable audience design condition, speakers saw 2 
relevant identical objects of different sizes: one target object and one occluded competitor 
object. Given that their addressee could see the target object but not the competitor object, 
speakers did not have to use a contrasting size adjective. However, unlike in the obligatory 
audience design condition, listeners were still able to select the correct object if the speaker 
did not consider the perspective difference.
We created two types of control conditions in which speakers and listeners saw the same 
number of relevant objects. In the linguistic control conditions (middle column Figure 2.3), 
the occluded object was replaced by another, unrelated object. As a result, speakers saw 
one relevant object fewer in these conditions than in the audience design conditions. We 
called these linguistic control conditions, because speakers were expected to produce the 
same description on these trials as on successful trials in the audience design conditions. In 
the visual control conditions (right column Figure 2.3), the object that was occluded in the 
audience design conditions was visible to both participants. 
Figure 2.3: Overview of the 6 conditions from the speaker’s point of view, and the expected speaker 
responses. In the audience design conditions, speakers can either describe the target objects (circled in red) 
from their own perspective (“medium glass”, “small vase”), or take into account their addressee’s perspective 
(“small glass”, “vase”). There is no relevant perspective difference in the linguistic and visual control conditions. 
The green squares were added to the figure for clarification, and were not visible to the participants during 
the experiment. They indicate the objects that differ between conditions. 
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As a result, speakers and listeners could both see all relevant objects. We called these visual 
control conditions, because speakers see the same number of relevant objects as in the 
audience design conditions. Neither of these control conditions required the speaker to 
take into account the perspective difference with their addressee in order to communicate 
successfully.
We created 12 different empty virtual arrays. The arrays were filled with 6 to 8 objects chosen 
from a total of 22 objects. Objects were selected from the Object Databank (courtesy of the 
Michael Tarr lab, Brown University, Providence, RI). Each object could appear in 4 different sizes 
to make sure that participants could not rely on absolute size. Depending on the condition, 
speakers saw 1, 2 or 3 relevant objects of the same type but of different sizes. The remaining 
objects were fillers that also appeared in sets of 1, 2 or 3 objects of the same type to make 
sure participants could not predict which objects would be relevant. We made sure that the 
speaker and the listener always saw the same total number of objects in a trial by adding 
additional filler objects to the occluded slots if needed. We have created a visual overview 
depicting the trial construction, which can be found in the supplementary materials. For 
each speaker, we created 288 trials by constructing 48 triplets of obligatory trials and 48 
triplets of advisable trials. Each triplet consisted of one audience design trial, one linguistic 
control trial and one visual control trial. Figure 2.3 shows examples of one obligatory triplet 
(top row) and one advisable triplet (bottom row). The target and competitor objects per 
triplet were identical in type, size and location, with the exception of the occluded object in 
the linguistic control condition. The number, proportion and location of filler objects were 
kept constant within each triplet, but we varied the type and the size of the filler objects in 
order to avoid memory effects. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the audience design and the 
linguistic control trials in a triplet were created using the same array. The array used in the 
visual control condition differed from this array in the location of one closed slot.Each of 
the twelve virtual arrays was used to create four obligatory and four advisable triplets of 
trials. The only thing these triplets had in common was the array that was used as a starting 
point. Target object-location pairings were only repeated within a triplet, i.e. three times 
throughout the experiment.
During the experiment, trials were presented in blocks of six trials that were created using 
the same array. Each block contained no more than one trial from a triplet. The order of 
the trials within each block was randomized, and we randomized the blocks of trials so 
that neighboring blocks did not use the same array. We created unique stimulus lists for 
each participant, detailing which object should appear where in each array. Based on these 
lists, the stimulus pictures, as presented to the participants, were assembled online in 
Presentation software. 
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Data analysis
We coded the sound files offline for adjective use. For the obligatory trials, we coded the 
use of small/large and medium adjectives (klein/groot and middelgroot in Dutch). For the 
advisable trials, we coded the use of bare nouns and small/large responses. In addition, we 
coded errors, false starts, repairs, speech unrelated to the task, and responses exceeding the 
response interval of 3500 ms, and removed trials that contained any of these from further 
analysis (10.45% of trials). Listener performance was calculated by determining whether 
listeners clicked in the right slot within the 3500ms-response interval. Finally, we computed 
planning durations (from cue onset until speech onset) and speaking durations (from speech 
onset until speech offset) from the sound files using a custom-made Matlab script. The script 
filtered and smoothed the waveform, determined an initial speech onset and offset by 
looking for sustained periods of silence and speech in the spectrogram and then calculated 
a more precise speech onset and offset by using increasingly smaller windows and lower 
thresholds. Informal inspection of the speech waveforms revealed that these calculations 
were accurate (example waveforms are included in the supplementary materials).
The statistical analyses were performed in R version 3.0.3 (R Core Team, 2014). We used the 
lmer function from the lme4 package version_0.999999-4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker & Walker, 
2015) to fit the linear mixed models and we built up the models from a simple to a more 
complex model. The linear mixed models (Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008) included a 
random intercept for subjects, a by-subjects random slope for condition, a random intercept 
for target object indicating which of the 22 possible objects was used as target object, and 
condition and number of objects as fixed effects. Models were estimated using maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation. The factor condition had three levels (audience design, linguistic 
control and visual control) and the factor number of objects had three levels (6, 7 or 8 
objects). We used the same model in every analysis, except that the reference distribution 
was changed depending on the dependent measure: Poisson for count data (number of 
fixations per trial), binomial for binary data (adjective use) and Gaussian for continuous data 
(planning durations, speaking durations, and fixation durations). Obligatory and advisable 
data were analysed separately. The obligatory conditions contained more relevant objects 
than the advisable conditions, so we could not compare them directly. 
The main effect of condition was tested by comparing a complete model containing all 
random and fixed effects to a model in which the fixed effect of condition was removed 
(the by-subjects random slope for condition remained in the model). For each dependent 
measure, two planned contrasts were performed in order to compare the audience design 
condition with each of the control conditions. We used the glht function from the multcomp 
package version 1.3-2 (Hothorn, Bretz & Westfall, 2008) to run these planned comparisons. 
More information about the data analysis can be found in the supplementary materials.
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Results
Adjective use
We computed the percentage of each type of response for the different conditions to find 
out how often speakers took their addressee’s perspective into account when producing a 
referring expression. For the obligatory trials, we treated the presence of the adjectives small 
or large as opposed to medium as a binary dependent variable; for the advisable conditions, 
we treated the presence of a bare noun as opposed to a size adjective (small or large) in the 
speakers’ descriptions as a binary dependent variable. 
Speakers adapted their language use to their addressee’s perspective in the majority of 
audience design trials (Figure 2.4), yet they failed to ignore privileged information on all 
trials. In the obligatory audience design condition, speakers mainly produced small/large 
responses (89.88%), although they also used medium responses (10.12%). Medium responses 
are accurate descriptions of the target object from the speakers’ perspective, but do not 
allow the listener to uniquely identify the intended referent. As expected, speakers mostly 
produced utterances that contained a small/large size adjective (97.32%) in the linguistic 
control condition and mainly medium responses (98.59%) in the visual control condition. We 
found a significant main effect of condition on the use of small/large size adjectives (χ2(2) 
= 41.71, p < 0.001). Both the difference in adjective use between the obligatory audience 
design condition and the linguistic control condition (b = 3.75, SE = 0.51, p < 0.001) and the 
difference in adjective use between the obligatory audience design condition and the visual 
control condition were significant (b = -8.77, SE = 0.72, p < 0.001). 
In the advisable audience design condition, speakers generally took their addressee’s 
perspective into account. They mostly produced bare nouns (79.84%), although they also 
produced small/large responses (20.16%). In the linguistic control condition, speakers mainly 
produced bare nouns (87.62%), and in the visual control condition they predominantly used 
small/large responses (98.90%). We found a significant main effect of condition on the use of 
bare nouns (χ2(2) = 39.88, p < 0.001). Both the difference between the advisable audience 
design condition and the linguistic control condition (b = 1.64, SE = 0.28, p < 0.001) and 
the difference between the advisable audience design condition and the visual control 
condition were significant (b = -6.60, SE = 0.60, p < 0.001). 
Overall listener accuracy was high: listeners selected the intended object on 93.60% of the 
obligatory trials and 97.70% on the advisable trials. As a manipulation check we looked 
specifically at listeners’ performance on audience design trials on which speakers described 
the target object without taking their addressee’s perspective into account (i.e., saying 
medium in the obligatory audience design trials and using a size adjective in the advisable 
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audience design trials). This was a small subset of trials, unequally divided over participant 
pairs (obligatory data: 2.98% of trials, advisable data: 6.14% of trials). On obligatory audience 
design trials, listeners only selected the correct object in 36% of these ambiguous trials; on 
advisable audience design trials, listeners were successful in 98.15% of trials. This confirms 
that our advisable/obligatory manipulation worked as expected: not taking the addressee’s 
perspective into account forced the listener to guess the referent in the obligatory audience 
design trials, but not in the advisable audience design trials.
Figure 2.4: The percentages of speakers’ small/large and bare noun responses for the obligatory (left) and 
advisable data (right). Bars indicate standard error of the mean. Speakers were expected to produce such 
responses in the audience design conditions if they took their addressee’s perspective into account.
Planning and speaking durations
We computed speakers’ planning durations (from cue onset to speech onset) based on the 
sound recordings to test whether ignoring privileged information during utterance planning 
is resource-intensive. We found no significant main effect of condition in both the obligatory 
data (χ2(2) = 1.82, p = 0.40) and the advisable data (χ2(2) = 0.84, p = 0.66). Figures of the 
mean planning durations per condition are included in the supplementary materials.
We also calculated speaking durations (from speech onset to speech offset). If ignoring 
privileged information is a resource-intensive process, this might also lead to longer 
speaking durations. We found a significant main effect of condition on speaking durations, 
both for the obligatory (χ2(2) = 26.23, p < 0.001) and the advisable data (χ2(2) = 45.65, 
p < 0.001). No significant difference in speaking time was found between the obligatory 
audience design condition and the linguistic control condition (b = -17.76, SE = 8.39, p = 
0.067). Speaking durations were shorter in the obligatory audience design condition than 
in the visual control condition (b = 86.54, SE = 12.38, p < 0.001), most likely because the 
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Dutch word middelgroot has more syllables than the other size adjectives (klein and groot). 
We found significant differences in speaking duration between the advisable audience 
design and the linguistic control condition (b = -26.61, SE = 8.96, p < 0.01) and between 
the advisable audience design condition and the visual control condition (b = 224.43, SE = 
17.52, p < 0.001). However, when we removed the advisable audience design trials in which 
the speaker did not take the addressee’s perspective into account (i.e. the speaker produced 
a size adjective), the difference between the advisable audience design condition and the 
linguistic control condition disappeared (b = 15.95, SE = 14.34, p = 0.46). Figures of the mean 
speaking durations per condition are included in the supplementary materials.
Number of fixations per trial
In order to measure when privileged information affects the production of referring 
expressions, we computed the mean number of fixations on the occluded competitor 
object in the audience design conditions and on the objects in the same locations in the 
associated control conditions (the objects in the green squares in Figure 2.3). We focused 
our analysis specifically on the planning duration window, i.e. in each trial, the time between 
the moment the array with the cued object was presented and the time the speaker started 
talking. For both the obligatory and the advisable data, we found that speakers fixated an 
occluded competitor object (audience design conditions) more than an unrelated control 
object (linguistic control), but less than a mutually visible competitor object (visual control). 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show how the proportion of fixations on the target and occluded object 
changes over time and give an overview of the number of fixations per trial. Figures 2.5A and 
2.6A clearly show that speakers initially fixate the target object they have to describe, and 
then consider the other objects in the array.
We found a significant main effect of condition on the number of fixations per trial in the 
obligatory data, (χ2(2) = 52.28, p < 0.001). We found significantly more fixations per trial 
on the occluded competitor object in the obligatory audience design condition compared 
to the occluded control object in the linguistic control condition (b = -1.57, SE = 0.15, p < 
0.001). We found significantly less fixations per trial on the occluded competitor object in 
the obligatory audience design condition compared to the mutually visible object in the 
visual control condition (b = 0.89, SE = 0.12, p < 0.001). To rule out that these differences were 
driven by the small percentage of obligatory control trials on which speakers responded 
with a medium response, we ran the same analysis including only trials in which speakers’ 
responses took into account the listener’s perspective (i.e., a medium response in the visual 
control condition, a small/large response in the audience design and linguistic control 
conditions). The differences remained significant in this analysis. Across the obligatory 
conditions, the mean number of fixations per trial is relatively low, even when the competitor 
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object was relevant (visual control condition). Some participants reported that they paid 
special attention to objects that appeared in triplets during the first half of the trials, which 
may have allowed them to plan their utterance after the cue without additional fixations on 
the other objects.
We observed a similar pattern in the advisable data. We found a significant main effect 
of condition on the number of fixations per trial, (χ2(2) = 41.99, p < 0.001). We found a 
significant difference in the mean number of fixations per trial between the advisable 
audience design condition and the linguistic control condition (b = -1.44, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001) 
and between the advisable audience design condition and the visual control condition (b = 
0.31, SE = 0.063, p < 0.001). This pattern remained even when we only included the trials in 
which speakers’ responses took into account the listener’s perspective (i.e., an adjective in 
the visual control condition, a bare noun in the advisable audience design and linguistic 
control conditions). These results show that speakers already distinguish between common 
and privileged ground while planning their utterance, although they do not completely 
ignore privileged information.
Figure 2.5: Eye-tracking results for the obligatory data. (A) Proportions of speakers’ fixations to the target and 
occluded objects from the moment speakers were cued until the end of the trial. Solid lines indicate fixations 
to the target object; dashed lines represent fixations to the occluded competitor object, the occluded 
competitor object or the mutually visible competitor object. Bounded lines indicate the standard errors. (B) 
Mean number of fixations (C) and total fixation time during the planning duration window on the occluded 
competitor object in the obligatory audience design condition, on the occluded filler object in the linguistic 
control condition and on the mutually visible competitor object in the visual control condition.
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Figure 2.6: Eye-tracking results for the advisable data. (A) Proportions of speakers’ fixations to the target and 
occluded objects from the moment speakers were cued until the end of the trial. Solid lines indicate fixations 
to the target object; dashed lines represent fixations to the occluded competitor object, the occluded 
competitor object or the mutually visible competitor object. Bounded lines indicate the standard errors. (B) 
Mean number of fixations (C) and total fixation time during the planning duration window on the occluded 
competitor object in the advisable audience design condition, on the occluded filler object in the linguistic 
control condition and on the mutually visible competitor object in the visual control condition.
Total fixation duration per trial
We computed the total duration of fixations on the occluded competitor object in the 
audience design conditions and on the objects in the same locations in the associated 
control conditions. We again limited the analysis to fixations during the planning duration 
window. Fixations that exceeded the planning duration window were truncated and we 
treated trials without fixations on the occluded object as missing data. Speakers fixated the 
unrelated occluded object in the linguistic control condition in only 6.49% of obligatory 
linguistic control condition trials, and on 16.08% of advisable linguistic control trials. Given 
that there were so few of these trials, we did not contrast the audience design conditions 
and the linguistic control conditions for this dependent variable. An overview of the average 
total fixation durations can be found in Figures 2.5C and 2.6C.
Speakers looked longer at mutually visible objects (visual control conditions) than at objects 
that were occluded from the listener’s point of view (audience design conditions). We 
found significant main effects of condition in both the obligatory (χ2(2) = 14.15, p < 0.001) 
and the advisable data (χ2(2) =27.12, p < 0.001). We found a significant difference in total 
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fixation duration between the obligatory audience design condition and the visual control 
condition (b = 31.82, SE = 9.41, p < 0.01). Similarly, speakers spent less time looking at the 
occluded competitor object in the advisable audience design condition than at the mutually 
visible object in the visual control condition (b = 22.53, SE = 7.16, p < 0.01). These results 
again support the finding that speakers already treat common and privileged information 
differently while planning their utterance.
Discussion
In this experiment, we investigated the effect of privileged information on the production of 
referring expressions. Speakers mainly produced referring expressions that took into account 
their addressee’s visual perspective. However, the availability of privileged information 
also led to the production of utterances that did not take this perspective difference into 
account. These findings are in line with previous studies using similar paradigms (Yoon, Koh 
& Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Wardlow Lane, Groisman & Ferreira, 2006). Interestingly, speakers 
even failed to completely ignore privileged information when it harmed communication (i.e., 
the obligatory audience design condition). In a previous study, Wardlow Lane and Ferreira 
(2008) also found that speakers were not able to fully ignore privileged information even 
when it threatened communicative success. However, in their study target objects were 
in privileged ground in certain filler trials, meaning that speakers could not systematically 
ignore privileged ground information. In the current experiment, speakers could fully ignore 
occluded objects throughout the experiment, yet even threats to communicative success 
did not prevent occasional interference of privileged information.  
In addition to studying the form of speakers’ referring expressions, we collected planning 
durations and eye-tracking data to address when and how privileged information affects 
the production of referring expressions. Speakers fixated occluded competitor objects less 
than relevant competitor objects both in terms of the number of fixations and the total 
fixation duration. This suggests that speakers did not initially treat privileged information 
in an egocentric manner as predicted by the Monitoring and Adjustment hypothesis, but 
that they take into account which objects are visible to their communication partner. More 
specifically, speakers used the information that was available to them in the first half of each 
trial to distinguish between common and privileged ground when they were planning their 
referring expressions. Despite this early distinction, speakers did not fully ignore privileged 
information when planning their referring expression. We found more fixations on the 
occluded target objects than on unrelated occluded objects. This shows that speakers’ 
general success at producing utterances that took into account their addressee’s perspective 
was not the result of fully ignoring all occluded objects. Fixations to the occluded competitor 
object might result from speakers’ occasional failure to ignore their own perspective. 
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Alternatively, speakers may deliberately fixate the occluded object to check whether it is in 
common ground, for example because they failed to look at the occluded object during the 
viewing phase or as part of monitoring during speech production. Based on our data, we 
cannot exclude either option. 
To test the prediction of the Monitoring and Adjustment theory that audience design should 
lead to additional planning time (Horton & Keysar, 1996), we computed and compared 
planning durations. However, unlike Horton & Keysar (1996), we did not find any significant 
differences in planning duration between the audience design conditions and the control 
conditions. One important difference between these experiments is that in our experiment 
participants had the opportunity to view the array and objects before they had to describe 
the target object. We included the viewing phase, because in most real-life communicative 
settings, speakers also have the opportunity to process their environment before they start 
talking. The viewing phase may have facilitated the speech planning process by allowing 
speakers to compute which objects were in common ground before they started planning 
their utterances. In addition, we repeated the same 22 images scaled to different sizes during 
the experiment, which may have allowed speakers to learn to identify absolute object size 
and may have thus facilitated target object naming over the course of the experiment. 
However, we consider this possibility unlikely given that the objects had different sizes to 
begin with and could appear on screen in four possible sizes, making it hard to determine 
absolute object size. 
Taken together, our results show that common ground does not function as a complete 
constraint on the production of referring expressions, but does exert an early effect during 
utterance planning. Speakers tried to use the information that was available to them 
during the first half of each trial to restrict common ground when they were planning 
their utterance, as reflected in the lower number of fixations on the occluded object 
during planning in the second half of the trials. When speakers fixated the occluded object 
during planning, this often did not prevent them from tailoring their referring expression 
for their addressee. These results support Constraint-Based Processing models. In this 
view, common and privileged ground act as probabilistic constraints to guide language 
processing in combination with other constraints such as context (Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 
2011). Given the lack of differences in planning durations and speakers’ relative success at 
tailoring their referring expressions for their addressee, weighing the available shared and 
privileged information appears to be a relatively efficient process. The finding that common 
ground functions merely as a partial constraint is perhaps best understandable when you 
consider that in many communicative situations the goal of the interaction is exactly to 
provide privileged information (e.g. giving directions or responding to questions). Maybe 
speakers’ attention to privileged objects should therefore be thought of as a useful feature 
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of communicative language processing rather than a failure to ignore irrelevant information. 
In addition, referring expressions that contain uninformative privileged information often 
do not prevent the addressee from identifying the intended referent, although they may 
temporarily confuse the addressee (Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006). 
Our findings of early and partial effects of common ground on language production are 
similar to previous findings in language comprehension research showing early effects 
of common ground in reference resolution (Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003; Heller, 
Grodner & Tanenhaus, 2008; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). This suggests that common ground may 
affect language production and language comprehension in similar ways. 
Conclusion
In line with previous studies using similar paradigms (Yoon, Koh & Brown-Schmidt, 2012; 
Wardlow Lane, Groisman & Ferreira, 2006), we found that speakers cannot completely ignore 
privileged information during language production and that the availability of privileged 
information can lead to the production of utterances that do not take the addressee’s visual 
perspective into account. However, we found no evidence that adapting to your addressee’s 
visual perspective requires additional planning time, suggesting that audience design is 
not necessarily effortful. Combined, these results suggest that the available privileged and 
shared information can efficiently constrain language production. These findings support 
Constraint-Based Processing models that predict that common and privileged information 
is incorporated into language processing in a probabilistic fashion. Our results show that 
common ground does not exert an all-or-nothing influence on language production. 
Instead, common ground influences the production process as a partial constraint already 
during utterance planning. 
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Supplementary materials
Supplementary Figure 2.1: Visual overview of the trial construction.
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Additional information about the linear mixed models
We used linear mixed models with a random intercept for subjects, a by-subjects random 
slope for condition, a random intercept for target object indicating which of the 22 possible 
objects was used as target object, and condition and number of objects as fixed effects. The 
factor condition had three levels (audience design, linguistic control, visual control) and the 
factor number of objects had three levels (6, 7 or 8 objects). We changed the coding of the 
predictors from the default R treatment coding to sum coding. We created separate models 
for the obligatory and the advisable data. Our final models looked like this:
example_model = lmer(EXAMPLE_DV ~ Trial_type + Number_of_objects + (1+Trial_
type|Subject_nr) + (1|Object_type), DATA, REML=FALSE, family=”FAMILY_TYPE”)
• EXAMPLE_DV = planning durations, speaking durations, adjective use, number of fixations 
or total fixation duration
• Trial_type = condition with three levels (e.g., advisable audience design, advisable 
linguistic control, advisable visual control)
• Number_of_objects = total number of objects visible to the speaker per trial (6, 7 or 8)
• Subject_nr = subject
• Object_type = target object, which of the 22 different objects was used as target
• DATA = the dataset, either only the obligatory or only the advisable data
• FAMILY_TYPE = Poisson for count data (number of fixations per trial), binomial for binary 
data (adjective use) and Gaussian for continuous data (planning durations, speaking 
durations, and fixation durations)
We used the glht function from the multcomp package to run the planned comparisons 
comparing the audience design condition to the control conditions. We changed the coding 
for the predictors in the following way to run these comparisons:
Audience design Linguistic control Visual control
Linguistic control – audience design -1 1 0
Visual control – audience design -1 0 1
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Supplementary Figure 2.2: Example waveforms illustrating our extraction of speech onset and offset. These 
example waveforms were generated by the Matlab script we used to compute the speech onset and offset of 
the speakers’ responses. The waveforms are plotted in green. The blue crosses indicate the speech onset and 
offset selected by the script. The plotted sound files were randomly selected from four different participants 
in the experiment. As can be seen in these examples, the script detected speech onset and offset accurately.
Audience design Linguistic control Visual control
Obligatory 137 98 126
Advisable 79 29 133
Supplementary Table 2.1: The number of removed trials per condition. We removed errors, false starts, 
repairs, speech unrelated to the task, and responses exceeding the response interval of 3500 ms. We noticed 
that we excluded a relatively high number trials from the advisable visual control condition (133) compared 
to the advisable audience design condition and the advisable linguistic control condition. Closer inspection 
revealed that 89 of the advisable visual control trials were removed because speakers first only mentioned the 
noun and then corrected themselves by adding a size adjective (e.g., “the tomato, the small tomato”).
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Supplementary Figure 2.3: Overview of mean planning durations for the obligatory conditions. Bars 
indicate standard error of the mean.
Supplementary Figure 2.4: Overview of mean planning durations for the advisable conditions. Bars indicate 
standard error of the mean.
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Supplementary Figure 2.5: Overview of mean speaking durations for the obligatory conditions. Bars 
indicate standard error of the mean.
Supplementary Figure 2.6: Overview of mean speaking durations for the advisable conditions. Bars indicate 
standard error of the mean.
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Abstract
Several studies have shown that communicative language production as compared to non-
communicative language production recruits parts of the mentalizing or theory of mind 
network, yet the exact role of this network in communication remains underspecified. In this 
study, we therefore aimed to test under what conditions the mentalizing network contributes 
to communicative language production. We were especially interested in distinguishing 
between situations in which speakers have to consider which information they do or do 
not share with their addressee (common vs. privileged ground information). We therefore 
manipulated whether speakers had to distinguish between common and privileged ground 
in order to communicate efficiently with the listener, in addition to comparing language 
production in a communicative and a non-communicative context. Participants performed a 
referential communicative game in the MRI-scanner as well as a similar, non-communicative 
task. We found that the medial prefrontal cortex, a core region of the mentalizing network, 
is especially sensitive to communicative contexts in which speakers have to take their 
addressee’s needs into account in order to communicate efficiently. In addition, we found 
neural differences between the communicative and the non-communicative settings before 
speakers started to plan their utterances, suggesting that they continuously update common 
ground in a communicative context.
Based on:  
Vanlangendonck, F., Willems, R. M., & Hagoort, P. (submitted). Taking common ground 
into account: Specifying the role of the mentalizing network in communicative language 
production.
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Introduction 
Recent years have seen an increased interest in the study of the neural mechanisms 
supporting the social and communicative aspects of language production. A number 
of studies have shown that planning a communicative action as compared to a non-
communicative action recruits parts of the mentalizing or theory of mind network, 
suggesting that people mentalize about their interlocutor’s intentions and beliefs when 
planning a communicative action. For example, language production in a communicative 
task as compared to a non-communicative task was found to recruit parts of the mentalizing 
network: the temporoparietal junction / superior temporal sulcus (TPJ/pSTS), and the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Sassa et al., 2007; Willems et al., 2010). Similarly, in a non-linguistic 
context, the pSTS is more activated when planning a communicative action compared to 
a non-communicative action (Noordzij et al., 2009) and during communicative pointing 
compared to non-communicative pointing (Cleret de Langavant et al., 2011). 
But what sets apart communicative from non-communicative language production? In a 
communicative context, speakers typically have to take into account what information 
they share with their addressee (common ground) and what information they do not share 
(privileged ground). For example, when explaining the results of your latest experiment 
to a colleague, you should take into account how much this person knows about your 
research topic and whether you have talked about it before. Such adjustments require 
that you continuously monitor common ground to create a model of what knowledge and 
beliefs you have in common with your interlocutor (Clark & Krych, 2004; Clark & Marshall, 
1978; Clark & Murphy, 1982). Some information for the model may be available from the 
start of the interaction, while other information only becomes available as the interaction 
unfolds (Brennan, Galati, & Kuhlen, 2010). For example, while explaining the results of your 
experiment to your colleague, you may discover that they know less about the topic than 
you anticipated, requiring you to adjust your language use accordingly. Here we extend 
previous studies on the neural basis of communicative language production by explicitly 
manipulating common and privileged ground in a language production task. 
We examined the neural mechanisms that allow speakers to adapt their language use to 
moment-to-moment changes in common ground by manipulating which information they 
do or do not share with their addressee, in addition to comparing language production in 
a communicative and a non-communicative context. We used a well-established paradigm 
that allows for tight control over the linguistic utterances that are produced. Speakers in 
the MRI scanner either described objects to a listener outside the scanner (communicative 
blocks) or for themselves (non-communicative blocks), which allowed us to tap into the 
process of building a model of your addressee. In addition, and most importantly, within the 
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communicative blocks, we manipulated whether the speaker had to distinguish between 
common and privileged ground in order to communicate efficiently with the listener 
(privileged ground vs. control conditions). In the privileged ground condition, speakers saw 
additional competitor objects that were occluded from the addressee’s point of view. 
They had to take into account that the addressee could not see these privileged-ground 
objects in order to communicate clearly with the addressee. In the control conditions, all 
relevant objects were mutually visible. In a previous eye-tracking study (Vanlangendonck, 
Willems, Menenti, & Hagoort, 2016), we found that speakers generally take their addressee’s 
perspective into account in this task, although they cannot completely ignore privileged 
ground information.
Our hypotheses are driven by recent meta-analyses that distinguish between subfunctions 
in the mentalizing network (Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 
2009). One proposal is that the mPFC supports inferences about other people’s or your own 
lasting psychological and social states, such as personality traits, while the TPJ is involved 
in inferring temporary states of other people, such as immediate goals and intentions (Van 
Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). In this view, building an overall model of 
your interlocutor during a communicative task might rely especially on the mPFC, while 
faster, moment-by-moment adaptations to changes in common ground could involve the 
TPJ/pSTS (Brennan et al., 2010). In the present experiment, we therefore hypothesized that 
using a mental model of your addressee might especially engage the mPFC, because the 
information in these models mostly relates to enduring features of the addressee. The mPFC 
should therefore be sensitive to the general difference between communicative and non-
communicative context. On the other hand, we expected that the TPJ should be especially 
engaged when speakers detect a relevant perspective difference during the communicative 
task blocks and need to adjust their language use accordingly. That is, we expected the 
TPJ to be sensitive to the distinction between information that is in common ground and 
information that is in privileged ground.
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Method
Participants
Twenty-four pairs of right-handed native Dutch speakers participated in the study. 
Participants did not know each other before the start of the experiment. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disease. They gave 
written informed consent before the start of the experiment. Data from two pairs were 
excluded due to technical problems and data from two additional pairs were excluded due 
to excessive movement by the subject in the scanner. The results of the remaining forty 
participants (twenty pairs; six men; 22.35 years old, range 18-28 years) are reported below. 
Theory of mind localizer data from two participants were excluded from the analysis due to 
excessive motion during this task.
Materials
The materials were created in the same way as in Vanlangendonck et al. (2016). We manipulated 
the number, size and visibility of the relevant objects to create 6 conditions (Figure 3.1). In 
the privileged ground conditions (left column Figure 3.1), a competitor object was placed 
in a slot that was open only on the speaker’s side. In communicative trials, speakers had to 
ignore this competitor object in order to unambiguously describe the target object, because 
speakers knew that the listener could not see the competitor object. In non-communicative 
blocks, speakers did not have to ignore the additional competitor object, because there was no 
listener present (see the procedure section below). We created two types of control conditions, 
in which there was no occluded competitor object. In the linguistic control conditions 
(middle column Figure 3.1), the occluded object was replaced by another, unrelated object. 
As a result, speakers saw one relevant object fewer in these conditions than in the privileged 
ground conditions. This condition is called the linguistic control condition, since speakers 
were expected to produce the same verbal response in this condition as in communicative 
privileged ground trials in which they successfully adjusted their response based on their 
addressee’s perspective. In the visual control conditions (right column Figure 3.1), the object 
that was occluded in the privileged ground condition was visible to both participants. In these 
conditions, speakers therefore saw the same number of relevant objects as in the privileged 
ground conditions, hence we call these the “visual control” conditions. 
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Figure 3.1: Overview of a triplet of trials from the speaker’s point of view, and the expected speaker responses 
in each of the six conditions. The task of the speaker was to describe a target object (red circle) for the listener 
(communicative blocks) or for him/herself (non-communicative blocks). In the communicative privileged 
ground condition, we expected speakers to take their addressee’s perspective into account (“small glass”). If 
they did failed to take their addressee’s perspective into account, they could also describe the target object 
from their own perspective (“medium glass”). There was no relevant perspective difference in the other 
conditions. In the linguistic control conditions, speakers were expected to give the same verbal response as 
in the communicative priviliged ground condition. In the visual control conditions, both participants could 
see the competitor object that was occluded in the communicative privileged ground condition. Speakers 
thus saw the same number of relevant objects as in the privileged ground conditions. The green squares were 
added to the figure for clarification purposes to indicate the objects that differ between the privileged ground 
and the control conditions. They were not visible to the participants. 
Twelve different empty virtual arrays were used in the experiment. Each array was filled 
with six to eight objects chosen from a total of 22 objects. Objects were selected from the 
Object Databank, stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for the Neural Basis of 
Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.tarrlab.
org/. Each object could appear in four different sizes to make sure that participants could 
not rely on absolute size. Target/competitor objects and filler objects all appeared in sets 
of one, two or three objects of the same type to make sure that participants could not 
predict which objects would be relevant. The speaker and listener always saw the same total 
number of objects in a trial because we added filler objects to the occluded slots if needed. 
We created a unique stimulus list for each participant pair. Trials were presented in blocks of 
six trials that were created using the same array. The order of the trials within each block was 
randomized, and we randomized the blocks of trials so that neighboring blocks did not use 
the same array. More information about the trial creation and randomization can be found 
in Vanlangendonck et al. (2016).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the roles of speaker and listener by means of a coin 
toss. The speaker performed the task in the MRI scanner, while the listener was seated in 
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front of a computer in the MRI control room. The speakers spoke through a noise-cancelling 
microphone and listener could hear the speaker over headphones. Participants completed 
four blocks of the main task (2 communicative and 2 non-communicative blocks), followed 
by a Stroop task localizer1 and a theory of mind localizer. The order of the four task blocks and 
the order of the localizers were counterbalanced. Each task block of the main experiment 
consisted of 60 trials, resulting in 240 trials in total. Before each block, speakers were informed 
whether the following block would be communicative or non-communicative. 
In communicative blocks, speakers and listeners played a referential communication game, 
in which the speaker described objects for the listener to select. Each trial featured a 4 x 4 
array containing objects of different sizes. Each array contained three closed slots on each 
player’s side, allowing us to manipulate which objects were in common ground. Objects that 
were visible to both players were in (visual) common ground, while objects that were only 
visible to one player were in that player’s privileged ground (Figure 3.2). Each trial consisted 
of a viewing phase and a speaking phase. During the viewing phase, each player was shown 
his or her side of the array for 3000 ms. During the speaking phase (4000 ms), the speaker 
named the target object for the addressee (Figure 3.2). The target object was indicated using 
a red circle and was always in common ground. On the basis of the speaker’s description, the 
listener clicked on the intended object in his or her display. A variable jitter of 3000-5000 ms 
preceded each phase of the trial.
The listener did not participate in the non-communicative blocks of the task. In these blocks, 
the speaker saw the same type of arrays as in the communicative blocks, but they were 
told that there was no listener and they were instructed to describe the cued object for 
themselves. Based on this instruction, we expected speakers to produce responses that did 
not take the distinction between common and privileged information into account in these 
blocks (Figure 3.1). 
Speakers were instructed not to use spatial descriptions, such as ‘leftmost’ or ‘third row’. Their 
verbal responses were recorded using a noise-cancelling microphone and they pressed a 
button when they were ready to start speaking, giving us a measure of the time they needed 
to plan their utterances. We recorded the location of the listeners’ mouse clicks, which allowed 
us to calculate the listeners’ accuracy. Before the start of the experiment, the speaker and the 
listener practiced the communicative task together using a real array and real objects. They 
then practiced the task together on a computer, and the speaker practiced the descriptive 
task by him/herself. The speaker also named all object pictures once before the start of the 
experiment to make sure they could easily recognize and name the objects.
1The Stroop task localizer produced null results so we did not include the results here.
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Figure 3.2: Trial sequence of a communicative trial from the speaker and the listener’s point of view. 
In the first phase of each trial, speakers and listeners each viewed their side of the array. In the second 
phase of the trial, a red circle indicated which object the speaker had to describe. The speaker planned their 
response, pressed a button once they were ready to start speaking and then described the target object for 
the listener. At the same time, the listener tried to click on the intended object. The trial sequence in the non-
communicative blocks looked identical, except that the listener did not take part in this task.
After the experimental task, speakers completed a theory of mind localizer task (Dodell-
Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2010; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Ackeren, Casasanto, 
Bekkering, Hagoort, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). During this task, speakers were presented with 
twenty stories that required participants to represent false content. In half of the stories the 
false content concerned the physical state of an object (false photograph); in the other half 
of the stories it concerned another person’s belief (false belief ). Each story was presented for 
ten seconds, after which participants were given a statement about the story to judge. They 
had to respond to the statements with a button press within five seconds. A variable inter-
trial interval of 4000-8000 ms preceded each trial.
Data acquisition and analysis
Participants were scanned in a Siemens 3T Skyra scanner using a 32-channel head coil. The 
functional images were acquired using an EPI multi-echo sequence (TR = 2250 ms; TE1 at 9 
ms, TE2 at 19.3 ms, TE3 at 30 ms, TE4 at 40 ms; 36 slices; ascending slice order; slice thickness 
= 3 mm; slice gap = 0.3 mm; 64 x 64 matrix size; field of view = 212 x 212 mm; flip angle = 90°; 
voxel size = 3.3 x 3.3 x 3 mm). A high-resolution T1 image was acquired using an MPRAGE 
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sequence (TR = 2300 ms; TE = 3.03 ms; 192 slices; voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm, field of view = 
256 × 256 × 192 mm).
Each of the four task blocks and the localizer tasks were scanned in separate runs. We 
acquired 30 additional functional scans before each block. These scans were used to 
calculate the optimal weighting of the five echoes, and this weighting matrix was applied 
to the remaining functional scans (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006). The functional 
images were processed using SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, www.fil.ion.ucl.uk/
spm). The preprocessing of the functional images consisted of realignment to correct for 
head motion, slice timing correction to the onset of the middle slice, coregistration of the 
functional images to the T1 based on the subject-mean functional image, normalization 
to MNI space and spatial smoothing using a 3-dimensional isotropic Gaussian smoothing 
kernel (full-width half-maximum = 8 mm).
In the first-level statistical model, we included six event-types modeling the viewing phases 
(1 per condition), six event-types modeling the planning phases (1 per condition) and two 
event-types modeling the speaking phases (communicative and non-communicative). 
Events were modeled from picture onset until the button press for planning, and from the 
button press until picture offset for speaking. We also included six motion regressors per 
run. A separate statistical model was created to analyze the theory of mind localizer. This 
model included four event-types (false belief stories, false photograph stories, false belief 
statements and false photograph statements) and six motion regressors. We used boxcar 
functions to model the durations (10 s for stories; 5 s for statements). All event-types from 
the main experiment and the localizer were convolved with the hemodynamic response 
function. Individual t-contrasts were created and used in second-level random-effect 
analyses. Group analyses were performed using one-sample t-tests. Whole-brain results 
were corrected for multiple comparisons by combining a p < 0.001 voxel-level threshold 
with a cluster extent threshold determined by means of a Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 
iterations, after estimation of the smoothness of the data (Slotnick, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003). 
This revealed that clusters of 41 voxels or larger indicated statistically significant effects at 
the p < 0.05 level, corrected for multiple comparisons.
For illustration purposes, we computed parameter estimates for regions of interest (ROIs) in 
the mPFC, and left and right TPJ using Marsbar (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). The 
ROIs were based on the mPFC and TPJ clusters found in the communicative privileged ground 
> communicative linguistic control and the communicative privileged ground > communicative 
visual control contrasts. We selected only voxels that were significantly activated in both 
contrasts. The temporoparietal clusters were part of a large, interconnected cluster, so we 
further limited these ROIs to voxels with x coordinates under -35 (left) or over 35 (right). 
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We coded the sound files for adjective use and we used speakers’ button press responses to 
determine the planning duration for each trial. We removed trials without a button press, 
trials without a response that could be coded and planning durations that were more 
than 3 standard deviations removed from the mean per subject from the dataset for the 
behavioral analysis (total 3.9 % of trials removed). Listener performance was calculated 
by determining whether listeners clicked on the right slot within the 4000 ms response 
interval. We then analyzed speakers’ modifier use and planning durations using 2 x 3 
repeated measures ANOVAs to investigate the effects of block (communicative or non-
communicative),  condition (privileged ground, linguistic control or visual control), and the 
interactions between these two factors. In addition, we tested whether we could replicate 
the results of our previous eye-tracking study (Vanlangendonck et al., 2016) by comparing 
the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the communicative control 
conditions. All behavioral analyses were run in R version 3.0.3.
Results
Behavioral results
Modifier use. Figure 3.3A shows the mean percentage of “expected responses”, i.e. 
responses that match the predictions in Figure 3.1. In the communicative privileged ground 
condition, we expected speakers to take their addressee’s perspective into account, while 
we did not expect speakers to take their addressee’s perspective into account in the non-
communicative privileged ground condition. A 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA with type of 
block (communicative or non-communicative) and condition (privileged ground, linguistic 
control or visual control) as factors revealed a significant main effect of condition (F(2,38) = 
14.86, p < 0.001), but no significant main effect of block (F(1,19) = 0.095, p = 0.76) and no 
significant block x condition interaction effect (F(2,38) = 0.16, p = 0.71 after Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed significantly more expected responses in 
the linguistic control conditions compared to the privileged ground conditions (t(19) = -2.97, 
p < 0.05) and in the visual control conditions compared to the linguistic control conditions 
(t(19) = -2.52, p < 0.05) after Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Speakers produced more expected responses in the communicative linguistic control 
condition compared to the communicative privileged ground condition, t(19) = 3.07, p < 
0.01, and in the communicative visual control condition compared to the communicative 
privileged ground condition, t(19) = 3.68, p < 0.01. These findings are in line with previous 
studies with similar designs that showed that speakers generally take their addressee’s 
perspective into account in communicative tasks, although they cannot completely ignore 
privileged ground information (Vanlangendonck et al., 2016; Yoon, Koh, & Brown-Schmidt, 
2012; Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008).
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Planning duration. An overview of the mean planning durations per condition can be 
found in Figure 3.3B. A 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA with type of block (communicative 
or non-communicative) and condition (privileged ground, linguistic control or visual control) 
as factors did not reveal significant main or interaction effects (block: F(1,19) = 1.84, p = 0.19; 
condition: F(2,38) = 1.65, p = 0.21; block x condition: F(2,38) = 2.18, p = 0.13). 
In order to compare these results with our previous eye-tracking study, we compared 
planning durations in the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the 
communicative control conditions using paired t-tests. We found that speakers took longer 
to plan their utterance in the communicative privileged ground condition compared to the 
linguistic control condition, t(19) = 2.53, p < 0.05. We did not find a significant difference 
in planning duration between the communicative privileged ground condition and the 
communicative visual control condition, t(19) = 0.82, p = 0.42.
Figure 3.3: Percentage of expected responses and mean planning durations per condition. The expected 
responses were coded based on the predictions in Figure 3.1. Planning durations were calculated from picture 
onset until speakers pressed the button to indicate that they were ready to respond. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
Manipulation checks. To check whether our block manipulation worked, we checked 
whether speakers indeed changed their strategy between the communicative and the 
non-communicative blocks. In the communicative blocks, we expected them to take their 
addressee’s perspective into account in the privileged ground trials. Indeed, we found that 
speakers produced mostly responses that took their addressee’s perspective into account in 
Vanlangendonck.indd   55 16-2-2017   15:06:04
56
Chapter 3
the communicative privileged ground condition (70.17 %). Given that there was no addressee 
present in the non-communicative blocks, speakers did not have to adapt their responses 
to what someone else could see in the non-communicative privileged ground conditions. 
In line with this prediction, we found that speakers produced descriptions from their own 
perspective in 75.22 % of trials in the non-communicative privileged ground condition.  We 
hence conclude that the communicative manipulation was successful.
In the communicative blocks, listeners tried to select the object described by the speaker. 
Overall listener performance was high (83.47 % correct), indicating that speakers and 
listeners understood the task.
fMRI results
The goal of the present study was to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying speakers’ 
ability to take into account common ground during language production. First we compared 
language planning and viewing in a communicative and a non-communicative context. We 
hypothesized that speakers would use a mental model of their addressee when planning an 
utterance in the communicative as compared to the non-communicative blocks. In addition, 
given that keeping track of the distinction between objects in common and in privileged ground 
only matters in the communicative blocks, we expected that speakers might use different 
strategies to explore the visual arrays before knowing which object to describe depending on 
whether they were in a communicative or a non-communicative context. Second, and most 
importantly, we compared language production in situations in which the speaker has to 
take into account common ground in order to communicate efficiently with their addressee 
and situations in which this is not necessary. This we explored in the comparison between 
communicative versus non-communicative privileged ground planning, as well as by comparing 
the communicative privileged ground planning to the two control conditions (linguistic, visual) 
in the communicative blocks. For the “viewing” analysis, we focused on the viewing phase of 
the trials (see Figure 3.2). For all other analyses, we focused on the planning phase, i.e. the time 
between the moment the speaker saw the array with a red circle around the target object and 
the moment they pressed the button to indicate that they were ready to start speaking. 
Communicative vs. non-communicative privileged ground planning. We first compared 
the communicative and the non-communicative privileged ground trials because speakers 
only had to take their addressee’s perspective into account in the communicative privileged 
ground trials. The effect of communicative context may therefore be strongest when 
comparing these conditions directly. The contrast between planning in the communicative 
and non-communicative privileged ground conditions resulted in a series of clusters 
described in Table 3.1 and visualized in Figure 3.4. We found two right superior frontal 
clusters, one of which extends into the medial frontal gyrus, a left superior medial frontal 
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cluster that extends into the left superior frontal gyrus, a cluster in the left insula and inferior 
frontal gyrus and a right inferior frontal cluster that extends into the right insula.
Communicative privileged ground vs. linguistic and visual control planning. We 
compared planning in the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the 
control conditions. The results of these contrasts overlap considerably, as can be seen in 
Figure 3.6. The contrast between the communicative privileged ground condition and the 
communicative linguistic control condition resulted in a large cluster covering parts of the 
inferior and superior parietal lobule as well as the superior occipital gyrus. In the frontal 
lobe, we found a superior medial frontal cluster, a right orbitofrontal cluster and left and 
right middle frontal clusters. Finally, we found bilateral insula and fusiform activations. 
Similarly, the contrast between the communicative privileged ground condition and the 
communicative visual control condition resulted in a large bilateral cluster covering the 
superior parietal lobule and angular gyri. In addition, we found a number of left and right 
inferior frontal, middle frontal and superior frontal activations. We also found clusters in the 
right fusiform gyrus and the right middle temporal gyrus, as well as in the left insula and the 
left cerebellum.
Communicative vs. non-communicative planning. We compared speech planning in the 
communicative and the non-communicative blocks, collapsed over conditions. This resulted 
in one cluster in the right superior frontal gyrus (Figure 3.4, Table 3.1).
Communicative vs. non-communicative viewing. Given that common ground is thought 
to be updated continuously during conversation (Clark & Krych, 2004), we expected that 
we may find neural differences even before speakers start planning their utterances when 
comparing communicative and non-communicative task blocks. This comparison revealed 
clusters in the left and right middle occipital and calcarine gyri, as well as the right postcentral 
gyrus, the left cingulate cortex and the right inferior temporal gyrus (Figure 3.5, Table 3.1).   
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Figure 3.4: Brain areas showing greater activity in the communicative planning conditions compared to the 
non-communicative planning conditions (red) and the brain regions showing greater activity during the 
planning phase of the communicative privileged ground condition compared to the non-communicative 
privileged ground condition (yellow). In the latter comparison, the effect of communicative context was 
expected to be maximal.
Figure 3.5: Brain areas showing greater activity in the communicative viewing conditions compared to the 
non-communicative viewing conditions.
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Figure 3.6: Brain areas showing greater activity during planning in the communicative privileged ground 
condition compared to the communicative linguistic control condition (blue) and the communicative visual 
control condition (green). The graphs below depict the parameter estimates in the different conditions in the 
mPFC, and the left and right TPJ. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Note that we did not test for 
statistically significant differences between the parameter estimates of different conditions in order to avoid 
making the non-independence error.
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Table 3.1: Whole-brain results for task contrasts of interest.
Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Communicative privileged ground planning > non-communicative privileged ground planning
right superior frontal gyrus 219 6.37 16 22 60
right superior frontal gyrus 5.19 18 30 54
right superior medial frontal gyrus 4.51 8 24 60
left superior medial frontal gyrus 199 5.04 -8 46 24
left superior frontal gyrus 4.66 -12 26 40
right anterior cingulate cortex 4.50 6 44 24
left insula 139 4.83 -34 20 -8
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.72 -38 22 -16
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.17 -40 32 -10
right superior frontal gyrus 41 4.40 22 66 6
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 45 4.33 40 24 -10
right insula 4.24 32 20 -6
Communicative privileged ground planning > communicative linguistic control planning
left inferior parietal lobule 6339 7.53 -48 -50 48
right superior occipital gyrus 7.50 36 -78 44
right superior parietal lobule 6.66 38 -58 60
left superior medial frontal gyrus 656 6.35 -8 30 42
right superior medial frontal gyrus 4.84 8 28 42
left supplementary motor area 4.38 -6 22 50
right middle frontal gyrus 619 5.92 48 30 34
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) 5.10 50 20 38
right middle frontal gyrus 5.02 44 38 32
left middle frontal gyrus 394 4.93 -34 6 52
left middle frontal gyrus 4.71 -46 28 34
left middle frontal gyrus 4.67 -36 12 34
right insula 62 4.73 34 24 -6
right middle orbital gyrus 56 4.61 38 48 -8
right middle orbital gyrus 4.01 46 50 -8
right fusiform gyrus 162 4.55 38 -74 -18
right fusiform gyrus 3.95 42 -56 -16
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
right lingual gyrus 3.87 32 -82 -18
left insula 97 4.48 -30 22 0
left middle frontal gyrus 94 4.47 -44 50 8
left middle frontal gyrus 3.68 -38 46 4
left fusiform gyrus 82 4.36 -38 -72 -18
Communicative privileged ground planning > communicative visual control planning
right angular gyrus 7803 7.15 54 -58 36
right superior parietal lobule 6.45 14 -64 58
right angular gyrus 6.43 36 -66 48
right middle frontal gyrus 3493 6.93 48 26 36
left superior middle gyrus 6.50 -4 32 38
right middle frontal gyrus 6.35 44 20 42
left middle frontal gyrus 1014 6.33 -38 12 36
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 5.03 -60 20 22
left middle frontal gyrus 5.01 -42 26 40
right superior frontal gyrus 653 6.12 34 62 14
right superior frontal gyrus 5.78 26 64 12
right middle frontal gyrus 4.93 36 64 2
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 287 5.76 32 24 -8
right insula 4.68 32 28 2
right inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.48 42 24 -16
right fusiform gyrus 133 4.68 40 -62 -20
right fusiform gyrus 4.05 34 -68 -16
right fusiform gyrus 3.73 26 -64 -12
right middle temporal gyrus 64 4.65 50 -42 -10
right middle temporal gyrus 4.30 58 -38 -10
right inferior temporal gyrus 3.88 58 -48 -10
left cerebellum 93 4.57 -36 -68 -22
left cerebellum 4.22 -30 -74 -22
left insula 65 4.33 -26 24 -4
Table 3.1: Whole-brain results for task contrasts of interest. (continued)
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Communicative all conditions planning > non-communicative all conditions planning
right superior frontal gyrus 106 4.74 18 20 60
right superior frontal gyrus 4.30 20 6 64
right superior frontal gyrus 4.27 18 28 58
Communicative all conditions viewing > non-communicative all conditions viewing
left middle occipital gyrus 241 5.75 -42 -80 6
left middle occipital gyrus 4.67 -36 -86 12
left superior occipital gyrus 4.29 -20 -96 18
right postcentral gyrus 362 5.60 42 -28 42
right inferior parietal lobule 4.35 44 -42 54
right precentral gyrus 4.30 38 -20 44
left calcarine gyrus 224 5.16 -14 -64 14
left calcarine gyrus 5.10 -12 -58 8
left middle cingulate cortex 61 5.03 -8 -34 50
right calcarine gyrus 205 4.89 6 -64 10
right calcarine gyrus 3.76 10 -56 12
right inferior temporal gyrus 66 4.51 48 -60 -6
right inferior occipital gyrus 4.00 40 -68 -6
right middle occipital gyrus 65 4.22 40 -78 22
Theory of mind localizer: false belief vs. false photograph. We compared the false belief 
and false photograph statement conditions from the theory of mind localizer. In this contrast, 
we found a large set of brain regions commonly found in theory of mind tasks including the 
bilateral TPJ, the precuneus and the mPFC (Table 3.2, Figure 3.7).
Table 3.1: Whole-brain results for task contrasts of interest. (continued)
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Table 3.2: Whole-brain results for the comparison between false belief and false photograph statements.
Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
False belief > false photograph statements
left angular gyrus 1995 10 -56 -66 24
left middle temporal gyrus 7.77 -46 -56 22
left supramarginal gyrus 6.16 -60 -52 36
left precuneus 4297 9.7 2 -64 38
left precuneus 8.24 0 -56 40
left precuneus 7.53 -12 -50 40
right superior frontal gyrus 4999 8.69 16 46 34
right superior medial frontal gyrus 7.51 10 50 30
left superior frontal gyrus 7.2 -18 24 46
right angular gyrus 2143 8.38 48 -48 28
right angular gyrus 8.32 52 -62 26
right middle temporal gyrus 7.65 56 -60 18
left temporal pole 1453 7.23 -54 10 -32
left middle temporal gyrus 7.06 -62 -22 -12
left middle temporal gyrus 6.42 -54 -4 -20
right middle temporal gyrus 1565 6.95 54 4 -32
right temporal pole 6.59 50 20 -30
right middle temporal gyrus 6.56 58 -30 -2
right cerebellum 224 6.75 24 -80 -26
right cerebellum 4.5 44 -74 -24
left middle orbital gyrus 162 5.93 0 60 -12
left superior orbital gyrus 4.17 -14 58 -10
left middle orbital gyrus 3.81 -22 54 -10
left caudate nucleus 76 5.71 -14 8 20
left caudate nucleus 4.88 -12 -2 20
left cerebellum 395 5.67 -28 -76 -30
left cerebellum 5.67 -18 -88 -26
left cerebellum 4.87 -46 -72 -26
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 46 4.81 -42 24 -8
left inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis) 4.21 -48 28 -4
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Figure 3.7: Brain areas showing greater activity during planning in the communicative privileged ground 
condition compared to the communicative linguistic control condition (A, blue), in the communicative 
privileged ground condition compared to the communicative visual control condition (B, green), and in the 
false belief condition compared to the false photograph condition in the theory of mind localizer (A & B, cyan). 
Discussion
In this study, we examined the neural mechanisms that allow speakers to adapt their 
language use to moment-to-moment changes in common ground by manipulating which 
information they do or do not share with their addressee, in addition to comparing language 
production in a communicative and a non-communicative context. 
Behavioral results
Speakers generally took their addressee’s perspective into account when designing 
referring expressions in the communicative blocks, although they failed to ignore privileged 
information on all trials. These results are in line with previous findings using similar 
paradigms (Vanlangendonck et al., 2016; Wardlow Lane et al., 2006; Wardlow & Ferreira, 
2008; Yoon et al., 2013) and mostly results replicate the findings of our previous eye-tracking 
study (Vanlangendonck et al., 2016). Speakers produced slightly less expected responses 
in the communicative conditions in the current study compared to the previous study. 
One likely cause for this difference is that speakers switched between communicative and 
non-communicative blocks in the current experiment, which may have made the task 
more difficult. Another difference is that in the current study, speakers’ planning durations 
were shorter in the communicative linguistic control condition than in the communicative 
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privileged ground condition. Comparing the planning durations across conditions (Figure 
3.3B) suggests that speakers were especially fast in this condition compared to the other 
conditions. 
fMRI results: communicative privileged ground vs. non-communicative 
privileged ground planning
Speakers were only expected to adjust their language use based on their addressee’s 
perspective during speech planning in the communicative privileged ground condition. 
We therefore expected that the effect of communicative context on speech planning may 
be strongest in the direct comparison between speech planning in the communicative and 
the non-communicative privileged ground conditions. This contrast revealed clusters of 
activation in the right superior frontal gyrus, the left insula and inferior frontal gyrus, and in 
the dorsal mPFC. 
The mPFC is a core region of the mentalizing network that may support the integration of 
social information over time (Van Overwalle, 2009). It is thought to be subdivided into a more 
dorsal section, which is activated when thinking about the mental states of dissimilar others, 
and a ventral part, which is activated especially when thinking about the mental states of 
similar others (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009). Given that speakers 
and listeners did not know each other before the start of the experiment and that successful 
performance in the communicative privileged ground condition required speakers to 
focus on differences in perspective, it is unsurprising that the dorsal part of the mPFC was 
activated in this comparison. Our whole-brain results suggest that the mPFC is selectively 
engaged by the communicative privileged ground condition. The parameter estimates 
plotted in Figure 3.6 illustrate this. The mPFC thus appears to be especially activated when 
speakers perform a communicative task that requires them to adapt their language use to 
their addressee’s needs in order to communicate efficiently. These findings mimic the results 
of a comprehension study that found that adult listeners only show increased activation in 
the dorsal mPFC when they have to take a speaker’s perspective into account to respond 
appropriately (Dumontheil, Hillebrandt, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2012).
fMRI results: communicative privileged ground vs. linguistic and visual 
control planning
When comparing the communicative privileged ground condition to each of the control 
conditions, we found a large, overlapping network of activations that include the core 
regions of the mentalizing network (Van Overwalle, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014): the mPFC and 
bilateral TPJ. 
Vanlangendonck.indd   65 16-2-2017   15:06:22
66
Chapter 3
We found activations bilaterally in the dorsal/posterior part of the TPJ in this contrast. The 
TPJ has been proposed to be important for inferring temporary states of other people, such 
as goals intentions and desires, even when they differ from your own (Van Overwalle, 2009). 
The posterior/dorsal part of this area may be especially important for the processing of 
mental perspectives (Schurz et al., 2014). Speakers’ visual perspective for relevant objects 
only differed from their addressee’s in the communicative privileged ground condition. 
The cluster we find in this area may therefore be the result of representing this perspective 
difference. 
In addition to regions involved in mentalizing, we found bilateral clusters of activation in 
the ventro- and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are known to play an important role 
in cognitive control processes (e.g., Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 
2004; Petrides, 2005). In the communicative privileged ground condition, speakers had to 
ignore an occluded competitor object. In contrast, all relevant objects were mutually visible 
in the control conditions. Previous studies (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; 
Wardlow, 2013) have shown that inhibitory control skills correlate with people’s ability to 
take another person’s perspective into account during social interaction, suggesting that 
adapting your language use to another person’s perspective depends on your ability to 
inhibit your own perspective.
fMRI results: communicative vs. non-communicative planning
When comparing brain activity during speech planning in the communicative and non-
communicative blocks, we found activation in a right superior frontal cluster. Although not 
considered one of the core components of the mentalizing network, it is interesting to note 
that this cluster appears in all contrasts we tested, as well in the theory of mind localizer. 
Similar right superior frontal activations have been found before in theory of mind tasks, 
including false belief tasks and tasks in which participants made trait judgments (Schurz et 
al., 2014). 
fMRI results: communicative vs. non-communicative viewing
The contrast between communicative and non-communicative viewing revealed a set of 
occipital and parietal clusters. One likely explanation for these findings is that speakers used 
a different strategy in the communicative and non-communicative viewing phases. The 
viewing phase allowed speakers to visually explore the objects in the array before seeing the 
cue indicating which object they had to describe. However, the distinction between objects 
in common and in privileged ground only mattered in the communicative blocks. Speakers 
may have therefore paid additional attention to the location of objects (in open or occluded 
slots) in the communicative blocks, resulting in increased activity in areas associated with 
visual attention (Corbetta & Schulman, 2002). 
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fMRI results: theory of mind localizer
It is interesting to note that the clusters of activation we found in the comparisons between 
the conditions in the main task only partially overlap with the results of the theory of mind 
localizer. The temporoparietal clusters we found in the main task extend more dorsally 
compared to the cluster we found in the theory of mind localizer task, and we find little 
overlap between clusters in the mPFC. One possible explanation for these differences is 
that the theory of mind localizer we used here is not the most suitable task to tap into the 
perspective-taking processes speakers engaged in during the main task. Adapting your 
language use based on what your addressee can see requires relatively low-level perspective-
taking (so-called level 1 perspective-taking). While both visual perspective-taking and false 
belief tasks require the representation of different perspectives, the neural correlates of these 
tasks do not completely overlap (Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Perner, 2013). Alternatively, the 
limited overlap between the task contrasts and the localizer results may be due to statistical 
thresholding. In line with this possibility, we found increased overlap when we lowered the 
statistical threshold, especially in the TPJ. 
General discussion
In line with previous studies, our results show that adjusting your linguistic message for an 
addressee engages the mentalizing or theory of mind network. However, this study is the first 
to tease apart the effects of communicative context and the need to adjust your linguistic 
utterance to take common ground into account. Our results suggest that the mentalizing 
network plays a crucial role when speakers have to consider which information they share 
with their addressee in order to be informative. We extend previous findings by showing 
that the mPFC does not appear to be sensitive to communicative context per se, but rather 
becomes more activated when the communicative context has consequences for linguistic 
processing (i.e. when speakers have to take common ground into account to communicate 
efficiently). The TPJ, on the other hand, may be important for processing and representing 
your interlocutor’s perspective when it differs from your own. It may therefore be especially 
sensitive to potentially relevant perspective differences. 
What do these findings mean for accounts of the neurobiology of language? One 
important finding is that the mentalizing network appears to be especially involved during 
communicative language processing when speakers have to take common ground into 
account. Our findings thus do not suggest that the mentalizing network always comes 
online when speakers design utterances for an addressee. Rather, areas involved in social 
cognition appear to be selectively activated when speakers need to take common ground 
into account in order to communicate efficiently. However, our results from the viewing 
phase show that being in a communicative as compared to a non-communicative context 
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can lead to neural differences before language planning has started (i.e., before speakers 
knew which object they had to describe). While we did not collect eye-tracking data, a 
likely explanation is that speakers were more sensitive to the distinction between common 
and privileged information in the communicative viewing phases as compared to the non-
communicative viewing phases. A recent MEG study (Stolk et al., 2013) also reported neural 
differences between communicative and non-communicative settings before participants 
were presented with a communication problem.  Combined, our results suggest that 
speakers monitored which objects were visible to their addressee during the viewing phase 
in the communicative blocks and then used this information to determine whether they 
had to adjust their linguistic utterance to take their addressee into account. This suggests 
that speakers in a communicative setting continuously update common ground and use this 
information to adapt their linguistic utterances based on their addressee’s needs.
In the current experiment, speakers could adapt to what their addressee was saying 
relatively easily by considering which objects were visible to the other person. However 
in most everyday settings, taking common ground into account also requires considering 
what your interlocutor knows and feels. Future research will have to clarify how the findings 
from the current study relate and extend to communicative tasks that require more high-
level perspective taking (e.g., considering what your interlocutor knows about a topic). In 
addition, it is important to note that during real-life conversations, the distinction between 
communicative situations in which speakers have to take common ground into account and 
situations in which this is not necessary is much less clear-cut than in the current study.
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Abstract
Learning often occurs in communicative and collaborative settings, yet almost all research 
into the neural basis of memory relies on participants encoding and retrieving information 
on their own.  We investigated whether learning linguistic labels in a collaborative context 
at least partly relies on cognitively and neurally distinct representations, as compared to 
learning in an individual context. Healthy participants learned labels for sets of abstract 
shapes in three different tasks. They came up with labels with another person in a collaborative 
communication task (collaborative condition), by themselves (individual condition), or were 
given pre-determined unrelated labels to learn (arbitrary condition). Immediately after 
learning, participants retrieved and produced the labels aloud in the MRI scanner. The fMRI 
results show that the retrieval of collaboratively generated labels as compared to individually 
learned labels engages brain regions involved in understanding others (mentalizing). This 
study is the first to show that collaboration during encoding affects the neural networks 
involved in retrieval.
Based on:  
Vanlangendonck, F., Takashima, A., Willems, R. M., & Hagoort, P. (submitted). Collaborative 
learning engages different memory retrieval networks.
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Introduction
Learning often occurs in communicative and collaborative settings, yet almost all research 
into the neural basis of memory relies on participants encoding and retrieving information 
on their own. Intuitively, it may seem only a small step to extrapolate that the memory 
systems that support encoding and retrieval in an individual context are also involved in 
encoding and retrieving in a collaborative context. However, there is tentative evidence 
from lesion research that suggests that learning in a collaborative context and learning in 
an individual context may at least partly rely on cognitively and neurally distinct processes.
Duff, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen (2006) instructed patients with hippocampal amnesia 
to perform multiple rounds of the “tangram task” (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) with a 
communication partner. In this task, a director and a matcher each have a set of abstract 
figures, but their view of the other person’s figures is occluded by a barrier. The director 
instructs the matcher to rearrange their figures to match the director’s order. Over multiple 
rounds of this task, healthy participants converge on a set of labels that are used to refer to 
the abstract figures. These labels become shorter and more efficient with each repetition of 
the task (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Interestingly, the amnesic patients could successfully 
learn novel labels for the figures over multiple rounds of the tangram task, but they were 
unable to learn arbitrary relations between labels and pictures in an individual paired-
associate learning task. These findings suggest that learning labels in a collaborative context 
may rely on cognitively and neurally distinct representations compared to learning in a non-
communicative context.
In the current study, we directly compared the neural representation of collaboratively 
generated linguistic labels to memory for labels that were encoded individually. During 
a behavioral session, healthy participants generated labels for abstract figures together 
with another person in a collaborative communication task (collaborative condition), by 
themselves (individual condition), or were given pre-determined arbitrary labels to learn 
by themselves (arbitrary condition). Immediately after learning, participants completed a 
communication task in the MRI scanner during which they retrieved the labels they had 
learned during the training session. This design allowed us to directly compare the retrieval 
of labels learned in the collaborative, individual and arbitrary contexts.
In line with the results in the hippocampal amnesia patients, we expected that the retrieval 
of pre-determined arbitrary labels should rely strongly on the hippocampus, while the 
retrieval of the collaboratively generated labels may be less hippocampus-dependent. 
More specifically, we hypothesized that the retrieval of labels learned in the collaborative 
condition would partly rely on brain areas involved in mentalizing, which are consistently 
found in studies of social cognition and interaction (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; 
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Frith & Frith, 2010; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
In addition, we expected that retrieving self-generated labels (collaborative and individual 
conditions) as compared to arbitrary labels may activate areas known to be important for 
storing semantic associations such as the left angular gyrus, middle temporal gyrus and 
temporal poles (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009). Behaviorally, we expected to replicate 
the results of previous tangram task studies during the behavioral practice phase. That is, 
speakers were expected to produce shorter and more efficient descriptions with each round 
of this task (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). 
Method
Participants
36 pairs of native Dutch speakers participated in the experiment. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disease. They gave written 
informed consent before the start of the experiment. Data from one pair were excluded due 
to excessive movement by the participant in the MRI scanner. The results of the remaining 
seventy participants (directors: 7 men, 21.43 years old, range 18-33 years; matchers: 6 men, 
21.34 years old, range 18-31 years) are reported below.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts: a behavioral session and an fMRI session. The two 
parts were completed immediately after each other. Before the start of the experiment, 
participants were randomly assigned to the roles of director and matcher for the duration 
of the experiment by means of a coin toss. During the behavioral session, participants were 
seated behind different monitors in the same room. The monitors were separated by a 
screen, so the participants could not see each other or each other’s monitor. The director 
learned sixty labels for pictures in three different tasks: a collaborative task, an individual 
task and an arbitrary task. During the fMRI session, the director performed a referential 
communication task with the matcher. We recorded the directors’ vocal responses during 
both sessions. The order of the tasks and the matching between the tasks and the picture 
sets were counterbalanced. An overview of the tasks is depicted in Figure 4.1.
During the collaborative task, the director and matcher were seated at different computer 
monitors. Each participant saw the same set of twenty pictures on their monitor. On each 
trial, the director was cued to describe one of the pictures, and the matcher tried to click on 
the intended picture. The director and matcher could communicate freely during the entire 
task, and could discuss each picture as long as needed until the matcher had selected the 
right picture. Both participants received feedback on screen (“right” or “wrong”) when the 
matcher clicked on a picture. Once the matcher had clicked on the described picture, the
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Figure 4.1: Set-up of the experiment. The top row depicts the three tasks participants performed during the 
behavioral learning session. Note that the matcher only participated in the collaborative task. The described 
tangram pictures are shown at the top to illustrate the relationship between the pictures and the labels. After 
completing these three tasks, the director retrieved all previously learned labels in the MRI scanner, while the 
matcher tried to click on the described pictures. The trial sequence depicts the task in the MRI scanner from 
the director’s point of view. Each picture was presented for seven seconds, during which the director planned 
and produced his/her response out loud. The director was instructed to press a button just before speaking.
director was cued to describe the next picture. Participants completed four rounds of the 
collaborative task. In each round of the task, the director was cued to describe each of the 
twenty pictures once. The locations of the pictures on screen as well as the order in which 
they were cued were randomized before each round. Afterwards, the director received a 
list containing all pictures and wrote down the labels they had come up with below the 
corresponding pictures.
The matcher did not participate in the individual task, but was seated in the same room. In 
this task, the director saw a different set of twenty pictures on their monitor. The director 
was instructed to come up with a label for each picture that he/she could easily remember. 
He/she moved from picture to picture by pressing a button. In each round of the task, the 
director was cued to describe each of the twenty pictures once out loud. Directors completed 
four rounds of this task. The locations of the pictures on screen as well as the order in which 
they were cued were randomized before each round. Afterwards, the director received a 
list containing all pictures and wrote down the labels he/she had come up with below the 
corresponding pictures.
Behavioral session
Collaborave task Arbitrary taskIndividual task
with
wings?
a tall 
woman
greeng m
greeng 
manprinter
the tall 
woman
Trial sequence director
+
+
Fixaon cross (3-5 s)
Planning & 
speaking (7 s)
fMRI session
D D DM
M
Vanlangendonck.indd   75 16-2-2017   15:06:23
76
Chapter 4
In the arbitrary task, the director was again presented with a different set of twenty pictures 
on his/her monitor. The director was instructed to learn a predetermined label for each 
picture. The matcher did not participate in this task. The director could move from picture 
to picture by pressing a button. When he/she pressed the button once, a cue appeared 
around one of the pictures. When they pressed the button again, the label they had to learn 
appeared below the picture. In the first round of the task, they could look at the pictures and 
labels without describing the pictures. From the second round onwards, they were instructed 
to say the label they had learned for each picture out loud when the cue appeared. When 
they were sure they knew the label associated with a specific picture, they could remove the 
picture from the practice set by pressing a second button. The directors practiced the labels 
until they had removed all labels from the practice set. Then they were asked to label all 
pictures once more to check their performance. 
The matcher had to study all the labels the director had learned during the behavioral session 
before the start of the fMRI session to allow participants to successfully perform the referential 
communication game together during the fMRI session. The matcher therefore learned the 
same sets of labels as the director during the behavioral session. In the collaborative task, the 
director and matcher established and learned the labels together over the course of the task. 
The matcher received the labels the director learned in the other tasks on paper and studied 
these in silence. He/she was given the list of pictures and corresponding labels the director 
wrote down after the individual task and a list of the pictures and corresponding arbitrary 
labels the director had studied. 
During the fMRI session, the director lay in the MRI scanner, while the matcher was seated 
at a computer outside the scanner room. The director spoke through a noise-cancelling 
microphone and could press a button on a button box; the matcher wore headphones 
and used a mouse to click on pictures. Participants were told that they would play a 
communication game in the scanner in which the matcher had to select the pictures named 
by the director. On each trial, the director was presented with one of the sixty pictures he/
she had studied during the behavioral session. The director was instructed to press a button 
once he/she remembered the associated label and to then say this label out loud. The button 
presses provided us with a measure of the director’s planning duration per trial. At the same 
time, the matcher saw 20 pictures, organized per set, and tried to click on the described 
picture. Trials for the director and matcher always started simultaneously, but differed in 
length. The director’s trials lasted 7 seconds and were followed by a jittered ITI of 3-5 seconds. 
The matcher’s trials lasted 9.5 seconds and were followed by an ITI of 0.5-3 seconds to give 
them sufficient time to select the right picture. All pictures were shown twice during the 
MRI task in randomized order, resulting in 120 trials in total. Before the director went into 
the scanner, we explained to both participants that they had learned the same sets of labels.
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Materials
The materials consisted of sixty abstract tangram figures, which were adapted from Read 
(1965). We ran an online pretest in which 20 participants rated 83 tangram pictures. They 
were asked to come up with a label for each picture and rated how difficult it was to describe 
each picture on a scale from 1 to 5. Based on these ratings, we created three sets of twenty 
tangram pictures that were matched based on the difficulty ratings and the predominant 
semantic category of the responses (animal, human or object responses). 
The labels directors studied in the arbitrary task were selected from the labels participants 
produced in the same pretest as well as in a previous pretest in which we used the same 
task but a different set of tangram pictures.  We only included labels that were generated 
for pictures that were not selected for the final stimulus set. The three sets of arbitrary labels 
were matched in terms of semantic categories as well as the average number of words per 
label. Each arbitrary label was then linked to an unrelated tangram picture. An example of an 
arbitrary picture-label pair is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Data acquisition and analysis
Participants were scanned in a Siemens 1.5T Avanto MRI scanner using a 32-channel head 
coil. Functional images were acquired using a T2*-weighted gradient multi-echo planar 
imaging sequence (TR =  2320 ms; TE1 at 9.4 ms, TE2 at 21 ms, TE3 at 33 ms, TE4 at 44 ms, 
TE5 at 56 ms; 37 slices; ascending slice order; 3 mm slice thickness; 0.51 mm slice gap; 64 x 
64 matrix size; 212 x 212 mm FOV; 90° flip angle and 3.3 x 3.3 x 3 mm voxel size). In addition, 
T1-weighted anatomical scans with 1 mm isotropic resolution were acquired (TR = 2250 ms; 
TE = 2.95 ms; 15° flip angle; 256 x 256 x 176 mm FOV).
We acquired 35 pre-scans before the start of the task in the MRI scanner. These scans were 
used to calculate the optimal weighting to combine the five echoes to one value per volume 
for each voxel, and this weighting matrix was applied to the remaining functional scans 
(Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006). Preprocessing was done in SPM8 (Statistical 
Parametric Mapping, www.fil.ion.ucl.uk/spm). The preprocessing of the functional images 
consisted of slice timing correction to the onset of the middle slice, coregistration of the 
functional images to the T1 based on the subject-mean functional image, normalization to 
MNI space (resulting voxel size 2 x 2 x 2 mm) and spatial smoothing using a 3-dimensional 
isotropic Gaussian smoothing kernel (full-width half-maximum = 8 mm).
We were interested in testing whether directors’ responses became shorter with each round 
of the collaborative task during the behavioral practice session. We therefore calculated 
how long each trial of the collaborative task lasted based on the time between stimulus 
presentation and the correct click by the matcher. In addition, we transcribed and coded 
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all responses produced by the director during the fMRI task. The responses were coded as 
correct or incorrect by comparing them to the arbitrary labels and the labels the directors 
wrote down during the behavioral session. Furthermore, we used the button press responses 
in the scanner to estimate planning durations in the scanner and counted the number of 
words per response. Two participants forgot to press the button during the task in the MRI 
scanner and one participant pressed the button at the wrong time (after instead of before 
naming the picture labels). We excluded their MRI button press data from the behavioral 
analysis, but included their fMRI data. We manually calculated the planning durations for 
these three participants by inspecting the voice onset time in the audio recordings of their 
responses using Praat (Broersma, 2001), and used these values for the fMRI analysis. For the 
analysis of the number of words per label and the planning durations, we excluded incorrect 
trials, trials without a button press and trials with planning durations that were more than 
3 SD from the mean per condition and the mean per participant. Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was applied when the sphericity assumption was violated and Holm–Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was used for all reported post-hoc tests.
We included five variables in the first-level general linear models: collaborative retrieval, 
individual retrieval, arbitrary retrieval, speaking and trials of no interest. The retrieval 
regressors were stick functions time-locked to picture onset. We included the planning 
duration associated with each trial as a linear parametric modulator. The speaking regressor 
was modeled as a stick function and we included the number of words per trial as a linear 
parametric modulator. The condition of no interest regressor included trials without a button 
press and trials with responses that did not match the labels learned during the behavioral 
session. Regressors were convolved with the hemodynamic response function. In addition, 
we included 24 nuisance regressors: the six realignment parameters, their square, their first 
derivative, and the realignment parameters used to realign the previous volume. Individual 
t-contrasts were created and used in second-level random-effect analyses. Group analyses 
were performed using one-sample t-tests. Whole-brain results were corrected for multiple 
comparisons by combining a p < 0.001 voxel-level threshold with a cluster extent threshold 
determined by means of a Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 iterations, after estimation of 
the smoothness of the data (Slotnick, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003). This revealed that clusters 
of 41 voxels or larger indicated statistically significant effects at the p < 0.05 level, corrected 
for multiple comparisons.
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Results
Behavioral results
First, we tested whether the tasks during the behavioral session differed in duration. In 
addition, we tested whether we could replicate the results of previous studies that used 
the tangram task. These studies typically find that directors’ descriptions become shorter 
and more efficient over time (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Brennan & Clark, 1996). We 
therefore compared the time per picture across the four rounds of the collaborative training 
task. Second, we compared the planning durations, accuracy and number of words per label 
between conditions in the fMRI session. 
Behavioral session. The tasks during the behavioral session were all self-paced, and there 
were differences in duration between the tasks (see Figure 4.2A). A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with condition as within-subject factor revealed a significant main effect of condition 
(collaborative, individual or arbitrary) on the total duration per task, F(2,68) < 0.001. Post-
hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between all conditions (p < 0.001 for 
collaborative vs. individual and individual vs. arbitrary, p < 0.05 for collaborative vs. arbitrary).
The duration per picture decreased with each round of the collaborative task (round 1: 27 s, 
round 2: 11.10 s, round 3: 6.76 s, round 4: 5.89 s; see Figure 4.2B). A repeated-measures ANOVA 
with round as within-subject factor revealed a main effect of round, F(3,102) = 120.58, p < 
0.001. A polynomial trend analysis revealed significant linear and quadratic trends across 
rounds (linear: F(1,34) = 145.08, p < 0.001; quadratic: F(1,34) = 92.85, p < 0.001). Our results 
thus replicate previous studies that found that directors’ descriptions become more efficient 
and shorter with each round of the tangram task. 
Figure 4.2: Behavioral results from the behavioral session: A)Total time per training task , and B) time per 
picture per round in the collaborative task. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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fMRI session. We performed repeated-measures ANOVAs with condition (collaborative, 
individual or arbitrary) as within-subject factor and accuracy, planning durations and 
number of words per label as dependent measures (see Figure 4.3). We found a significant 
main effect of condition on accuracy, F(2,68) = 34.42, p < 0.001. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that accuracy was significantly higher in the collaborative condition compared 
to the individual condition (t(34) = 2.81, p < 0.01) and in the individual compared to the 
arbitrary condition (t(34) = 4.91, p < 0.001). We found a significant main effect of condition 
on planning durations in the MRI task, F(2, 68) = 72.26, p < 0.001. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed significantly shorter planning durations in the individual compared to the arbitrary 
condition, t(34) = 9.40, p < 0.001. The difference between the collaborative and the individual 
conditions was not significant, t(34) = 1.55, p = 0.13. We found a significant main effect of 
condition on the number of words per label in the MRI task, F(2, 68) = 26.08, p < 0.001. 
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that responses contained significantly more words in the 
collaborative condition compared to the individual condition (t(34) = 4.61, p < 0.001) and in 
the individual compared to the arbitrary condition (t(34) = 2.70, p < 0.05).
 
Figure 4.3: Behavioral results from the fMRI session: A) percentage of labels recalled during the fMRI session, 
B) planning duration during the fMRI session (time from picture onset until the director’s button press, and C) 
number of words per label. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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fMRI results
We compared the retrieval of labels learned in the collaborative condition to labels learned 
in the other conditions to examine the neural mechanisms of collaborative learning. 
In addition, we compared the retrieval of labels learned in the individual and arbitrary 
conditions to examine the effects of learning self-generated labels. The results of the fMRI 
analyses are listed in Table 4.1 and presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The fMRI results are all 
from the retrieval phase of the trials between picture onset and the director’s button press. 
Figure 4.4: Brain regions showing increased activity during the retrieval of labels learned in different tasks by 
the director: the retrieval of collaboratively learned labels versus labels learned in the arbitrary task (yellow), 
the retrieval of collaboratively versus individually learned labels (violet), the retrieval of individually learned 
labels versus labels learned in the arbitrary task (light blue), and the retrieval of labels learned in the arbitrary 
task versus individually learned labels (dark blue).
Collaborave > Arbitrary Collaborave > Individual
Individual > Arbitrary Arbitrary > Individual
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Collaborative > arbitrary. The comparison between the collaborative and arbitrary 
conditions resulted in clusters in the precuneus, the bilateral angular gyri, medial prefrontal 
cortex and bilateral temporal poles (Figure 4.4, yellow). 
Individual > arbitrary. The contrast between the individual and the arbitrary conditions 
revealed clusters in the left angular gyrus, and in the temporal poles extending into the 
middle and inferior temporal gyri (Figure 4.4, light blue).
Figure 4.5: Overlap between the task contrasts depicted in Figure 4.4. Orange indicates the overlap between 
the retrieval of collaboratively learned labels versus labels learned in the arbitrary task (yellow) and the 
retrieval of collaboratively versus individually learned labels (violet). Green indicates the overlap between the 
retrieval of collaboratively learned labels versus labels learned in the arbitrary task (yellow) the retrieval of 
individually learned labels versus labels learned in the arbitrary task (light blue).
Collaborative > individual. The contrast of main interest was between the collaborative 
and individual conditions. This comparison revealed a series of clusters including a large 
cluster connecting the midcingulate cortex and precuneus, a right temporoparietal cluster, 
a cluster in the left putamen, bilateral middle frontal clusters and several medial frontal 
clusters (Figure 4.4, violet). 
Arbitrary > individual. The comparison between the arbitrary and individual conditions 
resulted in a large number of clusters including the anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral 
caudate nucleus, left hippocampus, bilateral insula, medial frontal cortex and the bilateral 
calcarine gyri (Figure 4.4, dark blue).
Collaborave > Arbitrary
Overlap Collaborave > Arbitrary and Collaborave > Individual
Collaborave > Individual
Collaborave > Arbitrary
Overlap Collaborave > Arbitrary and Individual > Arbitrary
Individual > Arbitrary
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Collaborative > Arbitrary
precuneus 2554 6.41 0 -46 48
right precuneus 6.12 8 -52 30
left precuneus 5.66 -12 -50 38
left inferior temporal gyrus 375 6.28 -52 -4 -32
left temporal pole 5.47 -48 10 -30
left middle temporal gyrus 5 -56 8 -26
right inferior parietal lobule 1546 6.2 60 -40 46
right supramarginal gyrus 5.29 64 -36 36
right angular gyrus 5.06 50 -66 28
left middle temporal gyrus 1204 5.53 -58 -56 22
left inferior parietal lobule 5.37 -60 -46 40
left supramarginal gyrus 5.14 -62 -46 32
right temporal pole 231 5.05 40 16 -34
right middle temporal gyrus 4.41 52 4 -30
right temporal pole 4.4 44 6 -38
right medial frontal gyrus 1135 4.86 6 56 4
left medial frontal gyrus 4.79 -4 54 8
right medial orbitofrontal cortex 4.62 8 50 -4
Individual > Arbitrary
left angular gyrus 736 5.6 -54 -58 26
left inferior parietal lobule 5.51 -52 -60 40
left inferior parietal lobule 4.57 -48 -74 36
right inferior temporal gyrus 122 5.13 56 0 -34
right inferior temporal gyrus 4.14 48 6 -34
left middle temporal gyrus 196 4.34 -54 -20 -20
left inferior temporal gyrus 4.22 -50 -4 -34
left middle temporal gyrus 4.08 -60 2 -24
Table 4.1: Whole-brain results for the comparisons between the collaborative, individual and arbitrary 
conditions.
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Collaborative > Individual
left putamen 279 6.07 -22 10 0
right midcingulate cortex 5056 5.73 14 -30 40
left superior parietal lobule 5.19 -16 -60 58
right precuneus 4.88 6 -52 56
right supramarginal gyrus 514 5.61 60 -42 36
right supramarginal gyrus 4.8 66 -42 30
right superior temporal gyrus 3.83 66 -38 20
left middle frontal gyrus 121 5.58 -28 36 30
right middle frontal gyrus 162 5.11 32 38 28
anterior cingulate cortex 3.49 20 30 28
anterior cingulate cortex 42 4.71 14 20 26
right medial frontal gyrus / supplementary motor area 173 4.56 2 0 48
left superior frontal gyrus 72 4.24 -16 -10 70
left inferior frontal gyrus 42 4.24 -38 8 10
right medial frontal gyrus 49 3.89 8 56 4
right medial frontal gyrus / supplementary motor area 63 3.88 10 -14 72
right precentral gyrus 3.58 16 -24 76
right lingual gyrus 42 3.74 18 -56 -10
Arbitrary > Individual
left inferior occipital gyrus 402 6.78 -54 -66 -16
left cerebellum 4.13 -46 -74 -22
3.92 -30 -90 -20
left caudate nucleus 1199 6.39 -12 14 -6
left thalamus 5.26 -2 -16 12
right caudate nucleus 4.83 14 16 -4
left anterior cingulate cortex 1508 5.84 -6 10 28
left anterior cingulate cortex 5.38 -2 34 22
right anterior cingulate cortex 5.18 4 28 28
left cerebellum 289 5.57 -6 -56 -20
left cerebellum 4.91 -8 -72 -24
white matter 691 5.2 -12 -14 32
left insula 5.18 -32 18 -4
Table 4.1: Whole-brain results for the comparisons between the collaborative, individual and arbitrary 
conditions. (continued)
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
left insula 4.89 -34 8 20
white matter 98 5.17 -10 -32 28
white matter 241 5.11 -18 -12 -10
left hippocampus 4.86 -30 -22 -8
left amygdala 3.82 -22 -2 -10
left medial frontal gyrus / supplementary motor area 346 4.92 -8 -4 74
right medial frontal gyrus / supplementary motor area 4.89 10 -4 72
left medial frontal gyrus / supplementary motor area 3.74 0 -6 68
right middle frontal gyrus 108 4.9 32 38 28
left cerebellum 80 4.83 -30 -60 -34
right insula 950 4.8 32 24 4
right insula 4.54 52 14 -6
right insula 4.47 30 24 -4
left superior parietal lobule 1315 4.54 -30 -64 44
right calcarine gyrus 4.38 16 -98 4
left calcarine gyrus 4.37 2 -88 -10
white matter 52 4.5 -28 -36 28
right caudate nucleus 82 4.48 20 -20 24
right thalamus 4.18 18 -18 14
left precentral gyrus 121 4.46 -36 0 36
3.86 -26 2 40
left precentral gyrus 3.62 -46 2 34
left cerebellum 55 4.36 -2 -46 -22
left postcentral gyrus 116 4.33 -48 -14 44
left postcentral gyrus 4.13 -42 -18 36
right rolandic operculum 42 4.22 66 0 12
left cerebellum 73 4.16 -48 -58 -34
brainstem 83 4.12 0 -14 -12
3.75 2 -24 -12
3.57 -8 -14 -4
right precuneus 81 4 18 -66 24
right superior occipital gyrus 3.97 26 -64 28
right calcarine gyrus 3.53 12 -78 12
48 3.87 0 -36 4
Table 4.1: Whole-brain results for the comparisons between the collaborative, individual and arbitrary 
conditions. (continued)
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Discussion
In this study, participants generated labels for abstract figures together with another 
person in a collaborative communication task (collaborative condition) and by themselves 
(individual condition), and were given pre-determined, unrelated labels to learn by 
themselves (arbitrary condition). They then retrieved these labels during a communication 
task in the MRI scanner. The analysis of the fMRI data revealed two main findings. First and 
most importantly, we show that collaboratively learned labels are neurally distinguishable 
from individually learned labels mainly in brain areas related to social cognition. Second, we 
show that the retrieval of self-generated labels as compared to unrelated, arbitrary labels 
engages semantic processing areas, while retrieving arbitrary word-picture associations is 
more hippocampus-dependent.
Collaboratively encoded labels are neurally distinguishable from individually 
encoded labels
The most direct test of the effect of collaborative encoding on memory retrieval is the 
comparison between the retrieval of collaboratively and individually learned labels. Labels 
learned in both of these conditions were self-generated, so the crucial difference between 
them in whether the labels were generated in a collaborative or an individual context. 
The results of this comparison include the right angular gyrus1, the medial prefrontal cortex 
and the precuneus. The temporoparietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the 
precuneus are considered to be key areas in the mentalizing or theory of mind network 
(Frith & Frith, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009), which is activated when people 
make inferences about other people’s mental states. The mentalizing network has previously 
been found to be recruited when people perform communicative actions (e.g., Sassa et al., 
2007; Willems et al., 2010) and during the encoding and retrieval of social information (e.g., 
Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002; Mitchell, 2004). For example, Mitchell (2004) found 
that subsequent memory correlates with activity during encoding in the medial prefrontal 
cortex during a social orienting task. Yet, our study is the first to show that collaborating 
with another person during the encoding of memories results in increased activity in the 
mentalizing network during their retrieval. Like the results of Mitchell and colleagues, this 
finding supports the idea of encoding specificity, which predicts that memories are encoded 
with specific cues related to the context in which they are encoded (Tulving & Thomson, 
1973). 
One important question is why we find increased activity in brain regions involved in 
mentalizing during the retrieval of collaboratively generated labels. Are these effects
1 The angular gyrus is often referred to as the temporoparietal junction in the social cognition literature.
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partner-specific, or more generally associated with collaborative encoding? Future research 
will have to show whether the mentalizing network is activated to the same extent 
when collaboratively generated labels are retrieved for a different addressee or in a non-
communicative context. While we also observed behavioral differences between the labels 
learned in the collaborative and individual contexts at retrieval, it seems unlikely that these 
behavioral differences can explain the observed neural differences. For example, although 
the collaboratively generated labels contained more words, we did not observe any neural 
differences in the classical left-hemispheric language network.
The retrieval of self-generated labels engages semantic processing areas
To test the effect of studying self-generated labels, we directly compared the retrieval of labels 
learned in the individual and arbitrary tasks. This comparison revealed clusters in the left 
angular gyrus and the bilateral temporal poles. We also found considerable overlap between 
the individual > arbitrary and collaborative > arbitrary contrasts in these areas (Figure 4.5, 
bottom row). In the collaborative and individual tasks, participants were free to come up 
with labels for the abstract figures. They probably tried to associate the abstract figures with 
their existing conceptual knowledge of the world. The temporal and angular clusters we find 
here are therefore likely the result of retrieving semantic associations between the pictures 
and labels (Binder et al., 2009; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Price, 2012). 
We only found a cluster in the hippocampus in the comparison between the arbitrary and the 
individual conditions. However, the hippocampus is probably to different degrees involved 
in the retrieval of labels generated in all conditions, with the arbitrary condition being 
most hippocampus-dependent and the individual condition being least hippocampus-
dependent. The involvement of the hippocampus in collaborative learning also became 
evident in follow-up research to the original study by Duff and colleagues (2006). While 
patients with hippocampal amnesia are able to learn linguistic labels in a communicative 
task, they are impaired in their use of definite reference in this task (Duff, Gupta, Hengst, 
Tranel, & Cohen, 2011) and have difficulties establishing linguistic labels for highly similar 
pictures (Duff et al., 2012). It remains to be tested whether patients with hippocampal 
amnesia would perform similarly to healthy controls in the individual task we used, and 
whether they would show the same partner-specific effects as observed in healthy controls 
(Metzing & Brennan, 2003). 
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Collaboratively generated labels are better remembered 
The behavioral results show that collaboratively generated labels were remembered better 
than labels learned in the individual and arbitrary conditions. This is an interesting finding 
given that the collaboratively generated labels were also on average the longest. Based on 
the literature on collaborative encoding and retrieval (Barber, Rajaram, & Aron, 2010; Basden, 
Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997), one may have expected poorer 
recall performance in the collaborative compared to the individual condition. One likely 
explanation for the collaborative benefit we find here is that the collaborative task induced 
more elaborative processing. Over the course of the interactions during the collaborative 
task, directors may have formed richer memory representations than in the individual task. 
For example, if the matcher fails to select the right picture based on the director’s initial 
description, the director has to come up with a novel description of the picture or provide 
additional detail, thus creating additional cue-target associations and facilitating retrieval 
(similar to the elaboration account of the testing effect proposed by Carpenter, 2009). Such 
prompts for elaboration are not present in the individual task. In addition, unlike previous 
studies on collaborative encoding, our collaborative task required participants to jointly 
come up with and agree on a set of labels to allow for efficient communication. This may 
have led participants to come up with coherent labels, which promote efficient collaborative 
encoding (Barber, Rajaram & Paneerselvam, 2012).
In conclusion, the present study compared the retrieval of labels learned in collaborative, 
individual and arbitrary contexts. Our results show that the retrieval of collaboratively 
generated labels as compared to individually learned labels engages brain regions involved 
in mentalizing. This study is the first to show that collaboration during encoding can affect 
the neural networks involved in retrieval. 
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Abstract
Language is a joint action that requires coordination between interlocutors. One way 
in which this happens is through the establishment of conceptual pacts, i.e. temporary 
and flexible agreements about how to refer to something. In a previous fMRI study, we 
found that the retrieval of such jointly established linguistic labels recruits brain regions 
involved in mentalizing, including the medial prefrontal cortex, the right temporoparietal 
junction and the precuneus. In this study, we further investigated the role of mentalizing 
in the establishment of conceptual pacts by studying the neural representation of jointly 
established linguistic labels over the course of repeated references. Participants generated 
descriptions for abstract figures either with another participant (communicative blocks) 
or by themselves (individual blocks). We found that brain regions involved in mentalizing 
were most strongly recruited during the initial stages of jointly establishing linguistic labels 
and following misunderstandings between the participants. In addition, we found evidence 
that the establishment of conceptual pacts at least partly relies on domain-general episodic 
memory processes.
Based on:  
Vanlangendonck, F., Willems, R. M., & Hagoort, P. (in preparation). The role of the 
mentalizing network in the establishment of conceptual pacts.
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Introduction
Language use is a form of joint action (Clark, 1996). A key feature of joint actions is that they 
require participants to coordinate their actions (Clark, 1996; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 
2006). When people talk to each other, they coordinate turn-taking (Sacks, Schegloff, & 
Jefferson, 1974), spatial perspectives (Schober, 1993), visual attention (Richardson, Dale, & 
Kirkham, 2007) and meaning (Brennan & Clark, 1996). In this study, we investigated how the 
process of coordinating meaning shapes the neural representations of linguistic labels that 
are jointly established by communicators. 
What does coordination of meaning look like? Imagine the following conversation between 
two friends looking at the store window of a shoe store:
- What do you think of those pumps? 
- The pointy ones? 
- Yes, next to the purple shoes. 
- They might look good with the dress we saw earlier.
Over the course of this short interaction, the friends have jointly established a label for the 
shoes (“the pointy ones”) and have thus established a conceptual pact, i.e. a temporary, 
flexible agreement about how to conceptualize something (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Once a 
conceptual pact has been established, speakers are likely to use it again in later references 
(Brennan & Clark, 1996).The establishment of conceptual pacts has been studied extensively 
using referential communication tasks such as the tangram task (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), 
in which a director instructs a matcher to reorder the same set of abstract tangram figures 
multiple times. The labels speakers use tend to become shorter and more efficient with each 
repetition of the task (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). 
Despite the extensive behavioral literature, the cognitive and neural mechanisms that 
underlie the establishment of conceptual pacts are still poorly understood. There is evidence 
that conceptual pacts are partner-specific (e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; 
Metzing & Brennan, 2003), but it is unclear how such partner-specific information is stored in 
memory. Horton & Gerrig (2005) proposed that domain-general episodic memory processes 
could support the associations between conceptual pacts and conversation partners. In this 
view, conversation partners create rich episodic memory traces of their interactions, thus 
linking interlocutors and conceptual pacts in memory. The presence of an interlocutor can 
then lead to the automatic retrieval of related information. 
However, there is also evidence that learning labels in a communicative as compared to an 
individual setting may at least to some extent rely on neurally distinguishable resources. 
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One interesting line of research (Duff, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006) showed that patients 
with hippocampal amnesia can successfully establish conceptual pacts over a series of 
interactions, while they are unable to learn arbitrary relations between labels and pictures in 
an individual paired-associate learning task. In a previous fMRI study, we directly compared 
the retrieval of conceptual pacts as opposed to individually encoded linguistic labels. We 
found that the retrieval of conceptual pacts recruits brain regions involved in mentalizing, 
i.e. people’s ability to mentally put themselves in someone else’s shoes (Amodio & Frith, 2006; 
Frith & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2010; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Van 
Overwalle, 2009). These findings suggest that conceptual pacts are neurally distinguishable 
from individually learned labels in brain areas involved in mentalizing and that the process 
of jointly establishing a linguistic label can affect the brain networks involved at retrieval.
In the current study, we aimed to investigate how brain regions involved in mentalizing 
contribute to the establishment of conceptual pacts.  Participants in the experiment 
performed a communicative task based on the tangram task and an individual control task 
in the MRI scanner. In the communicative task, participants generated linguistic labels for 
a set of tangram pictures, while another participant outside the scanner tried to click on 
the described pictures. Participants in the scanner received direct feedback on the other 
participant’s performance, allowing them to adjust their descriptions until they established 
a set of shared linguistic labels. In the individual task, participants in the MRI scanner came 
up with linguistic labels for a different set of tangram figures by themselves. Participants in 
the MRI scanner also completed a theory of mind localizer to independently localize brains 
regions involved in mentalizing. This design allowed us to investigate the recruitment of 
brain regions involved in mentalizing over the course of multiple rounds of the tangram 
task. By directly comparing the communicative and individual tasks, we could control for the 
effects of repeated viewing and naming of the figures. 
Based on our previous study, we expected that communicative as compared to individual 
encoding of linguistic labels would engage parts of the mentalizing network. We were 
especially interested in studying how representations of conceptual pacts change as they 
are established and whether this would lead to increased or decreased engagement of the 
mentalizing network. In line with the principle of least collaborative effort (Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986), one may expect that interlocutors mostly use mentalizing during the initial 
stages of establishing a conceptual pact. On the other hand, our previous study suggests that 
the mentalizing network is still consistently involved at retrieval even after several rounds of 
the tangram task. At the whole-brain level, we were especially interested in the recruitment 
of memory structures involved in episodic memory encoding and retrieval to see whether 
we could find support for the involvement of episodic memory processes as proposed by 
Horton & Gerrig (2005). In addition to studying the establishment of conceptual pacts, we 
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were interested in the influence of feedback from the matcher on the coordination process. 
We therefore compared first attempts to describe the figures (without feedback from the 
matcher) to later attempts after having received feedback from the matcher. We expected 
that the effect of communicative context may be maximal in the case of a misunderstanding, 
when mentalizing may be required to adjust your response based on your addressee’s 
feedback.
Method
Participants
72 native Dutch speakers (36 pairs) participated in the experiment. They all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disease. Participants gave written 
informed consent before the start of the experiment and received course credit or monetary 
compensation for their participation. Data from six pairs were excluded (two pairs due to 
excessive motion by the participant in the MRI scanner, one pair due to technical problems 
with the sound recordings and three pairs due to artifacts during data acquisition). The results 
of the remaining thirty pairs (MRI: 8 men; 22.73 years old, range 18-36 years; behavioral: 5 
men, 22.13 years old, range 18-31 years) are reported below. Four MRI participants did not 
complete the theory of mind localizer. 
Procedure
The experiment consisted of a picture description task and a theory of mind localizer. Before 
the start of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to the roles of director or 
matcher for the duration of the experiment. The director performed the picture description 
task in the MRI scanner using a noise-cancelling microphone and a button box. The matcher 
was seated in the MRI lab wearing headphones and responded using a mouse. The directors’ 
verbal responses were played to the matcher in real time and were recorded for offline 
coding.
The picture description task consisted of three communicative blocks and three individual 
blocks. Each block featured a new set of ten tangram pictures. During the communicative 
blocks, the directors and matchers were presented with the same set of ten tangram figures. 
On each trial, directors were cued to describe the picture around which a green square 
appeared using a maximum of two words. They came up with a description for the picture, 
pressed a button when they were ready to start speaking, and then said their description 
out loud. The matchers could then select one or multiple pictures depending on how certain 
they were of what they thought the director had described. The matchers saw blue squares 
appear around the pictures they clicked on. If the matchers clicked on the described picture, 
and this was the only picture they clicked on, the trial ended. The directors were then cued 
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to describe the next tangram picture. In all other cases (multiple pictures, no pictures or 
wrong picture selected), the directors were cued (with a green square) to describe the same 
picture again and received feedback about which pictures the matcher had selected based 
on their previous description (blue squares). During these repeated attempts, the message 
“same picture” appeared on the matchers’ screen so that they knew that the director was 
describing the same picture again.  After four failed attempts to describe a specific picture, 
the task moved on to the next target picture.
The individual blocks were visually very similar to the communicative blocks, but the matchers 
did not participate in these blocks.  Like in the communicative blocks, the directors saw ten 
tangram figures on screen at a time and were cued to describe the picture around which a 
green square appeared using at most two words. The directors knew that the matchers did 
not participate in the individual blocks and were instructed to come up with labels for the 
pictures based on what they saw in the pictures. They came up with a description for the 
target picture, pressed a button when they were ready to start speaking, and then said their 
description out loud. On some trials, the directors were cued to describe the same picture 
multiple times in a row. In that case, they were instructed to change their previous description 
(e.g., by modifying their previous description or generating a new label). Occasionally, blue 
squares could appear around some of the pictures. Directors were told that the repetition of 
target pictures and the appearance of blue squares around certain pictures were determined 
by the computer to make the individual and communicative blocks as similar as possible, 
and that they did not depend on the quality of the directors’ responses. 
Before the start of the experiment, participants practiced the picture description task outside 
the scanner. They completed one communicative and one individual block of the task using 
sets of tangram pictures that were not used in the MRI experiment. During the MRI phase, 
the communicative and individual blocks alternated, and the experiment always started 
with a communicative block. This allowed us to carefully match the number of repetitions 
and the visual presentation of the stimuli between communicative and individual blocks. 
The number of repetitions per picture and the kind of feedback the director received 
in the communicative blocks were recorded and used to determine the repetitions and 
appearance of blue squares in the individual blocks. For example, if the third trial in the first 
communicative block was repeated and the matcher had clicked on three pictures, then 
the third trial in the next individual block was repeated and the director saw blue squares in 
the same locations as the pictures the matcher had clicked in the communicative block (see 
Figure 5.1). 
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Each block of the task featured a new set of ten pictures and consisted of three rounds. In 
each round, the director described each picture at least once (depending on the number 
of repetitions). The locations of the pictures and the order in which they were cued were 
randomized before each communicative block. The following individual block used the 
same picture randomization. Trials for the director lasted 7 s and were preceded by a 3-5 s 
jittered inter-trial interval. Trials for the matcher lasted 9.5 s (7 s of the director’s trial + 2.5 s 
of the director’s ITI) to give them enough time to click on pictures.
Figure 5.1: The experimental set-up and example trials from the picture description task. In the communicative 
blocks, the director describes the target pictures for the matcher outside the scanner. On each trial in the 
communicative blocks, the director describes a target picture (in green) and the matcher tries to click on the 
described picture based on the director’s response. In the communicative example trial sequence (left), the 
matcher initially clicks on three pictures. The director then receives the feedback from the matcher (in blue) 
and tries to describe the same picture again. When the matcher selects the correct picture, the director is 
cued to describe the next target picture and the matcher tries to click on this picture. In the individual blocks, 
the director describes the target pictures for him- or herself. The trial sequence in the individual blocks (right) 
is matched to the trial sequence in the communicative blocks, but uses a different set of tangram pictures. 
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After the picture description task, participants in the MRI scanner completed a theory of 
mind localizer task (Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2010; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Van Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). During this task, they 
were presented with twenty stories that required them to represent false content. In half of 
the stories the false content concerned the physical state of an object (false photograph); in 
the other half of the stories it concerned another person’s belief (false belief ). Each story was 
presented for ten seconds, after which participants were given a statement about the story 
to judge. They had to respond to the statements with a button press within five seconds. A 
variable inter-trial interval of 4000-8000 ms preceded each trial.
Materials
The stimuli consisted of sixty abstract tangram figures, which were adapted from Read 
(1965). The stimulus set was initially created for and previously used in another experiment 
(chapter 4). We divided the sixty pictures into six sets of ten pictures based on difficulty 
ratings and the predominant semantic category (animal, person or object) of the responses 
obtained in a pretest. The order of the picture sets and the pairing between picture sets and 
blocks were counterbalanced.
Data acquisition and analysis
Participants were scanned in a Siemens 3T Prisma MRI scanner using a 32-channel head coil. 
Functional images were acquired using a T2*-weighted gradient multi-echo planar imaging 
sequence (TR = 2240 ms; TE1 at 9 ms, TE2 at 19.1 ms, TE3 at 29.14 ms, TE4 at 39.21 ms, TE5 at 
49.28 ms; 32 slices; ascending slice order; 3 mm slice thickness; 0.56 mm slice gap; 64 x 64 
matrix size; 224 x 224 mm FOV; 90° flip angle and 3.5 x 3.5 x 3 mm voxel size). In addition, 
T1-weighted anatomical scans with 1 mm isotropic resolution were acquired (TR = 2300 ms; 
TE = 3.03 ms; 8° flip angle; 256 x 256 x 192 mm FOV).
We acquired 35 pre-scans before the start of each task in the MRI scanner. These scans 
were used to calculate the optimal weighting of the five echoes, and this weighting matrix 
was applied to the remaining functional scans (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006). 
Preprocessing was done in SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, www.fil.ion.ucl.uk/spm). 
The preprocessing of the functional images consisted of slice timing correction to the onset 
of the middle slice, coregistration of the functional images to the T1 based on the subject-
mean functional image, normalization to MNI space (resulting voxel size 2 x 2 x 2 mm) and 
spatial smoothing using a 3-dimensional isotropic Gaussian smoothing kernel (full-width 
half-maximum = 8 mm).
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The speakers’ verbal responses were transcribed and coded by comparing the responses 
both within and across rounds. First, we wanted to test whether directors used consistent 
responses over multiple rounds of the picture description task, i.e. whether they repeated 
their previous responses when they were cued to describe the same picture in a later round. 
In order to test this, we compared the responses from the second and third rounds to all 
preceding responses. Only responses that were identical or that at least partly overlapped 
in form with previous responses were considered to be consistent (e.g., bird vs. large bird). 
Second, we coded whether responses were a first attempt to describe a picture (i.e., initial 
response in a round) or a repetition (i.e., attempts after the initial response per round).
Consistency model. We created two types of first-level general linear models to analyze the 
results of the picture description task. The first model allowed us to look at how linguistic 
labels are established over the course of repeated references. We focused on consistent 
responses (see coding above), as speakers were expected to reuse previously established 
conceptual pacts in later references. Consistent hence means consistent with the descriptions 
in previous rounds. This model allowed us to directly compare consistent responses in the 
different rounds of the communicative and individual blocks. We included eight variables in 
these models: first round responses in the communicative blocks, first round responses in the 
individual blocks1, second round consistent responses in the communicative blocks, second 
round consistent responses in the individual blocks, third round consistent responses in the 
communicative blocks, third round consistent responses in the individual blocks, speaking, 
and responses of no interest.  The first six regressors were stick functions time-locked to 
picture onset. We included the planning duration associated with each response as a linear 
parametric modulator. The speaking regressor was modeled as a stick function and we 
included the number of words per response as a linear parametric modulator. The condition 
of no interest regressor was modeled as a boxcar function (7 s) and included inconsistent 
responses from the second and third rounds (i.e., responses without at least partial overlap 
with previous responses), as well responses without a button press or a verbal response and 
responses that contained speech unrelated to the task. 
Repetition model. The second type of model allowed us to test the effect of communicative 
context on first attempts to describe a picture as well as on repetitions after directors received 
feedback from the matcher. This model allowed us to directly compare first attempts and 
repetitions between the communicative and individual blocks, collapsed across rounds. 
We included six variables in these models: first attempts in the communicative blocks, first 
attempts in the individual blocks, repetitions in the communicative blocks, repetitions in
1   We could not compare the responses from the first round to previous responses, so we included all first 
round responses in the first round regressors (except responses without a verbal response or a button press 
and responses that contained speech unrelated to the task).
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 the individual blocks, speaking, and responses of no interest.  The first four regressors were 
stick functions time-locked to picture onset. We included the planning duration associated 
with each response as a linear parametric modulator. The speaking regressor was modeled 
as a stick function and we included the number of words per response as a linear parametric 
modulator. The condition of no interest regressor was modeled as a boxcar function (7 s) and 
included responses without a button press or speech, as well as responses that contained 
speech unrelated to the task. 
In addition to the models used to analyze the picture description data, we created first-
level general linear models to analyze the theory of mind localizer. These statistical models 
included four regressors: false belief stories, false photograph stories, false belief statements 
and false photograph statements. We used boxcar functions to model the durations (10 s for 
stories; 5 s for statements).
For all models, regressors were convolved with the hemodynamic response function. In 
addition, we included 24 nuisance regressors: the six realignment parameters, their square, 
their first derivative, and the realignment parameters used to realign the previous volume. 
Individual t-contrasts were created and used in second-level random-effect analyses. Group 
analyses were performed using one-sample t-tests. Whole-brain results were corrected for 
multiple comparisons by combining a p < 0.001 voxel-level threshold with a cluster extent 
threshold determined by means of a Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 iterations, after 
estimation of the smoothness of the data (Slotnick, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003). This revealed 
that clusters of 46 voxels or larger indicated statistically significant effects at the p < 0.05 
level, corrected for multiple comparisons. 
We ran region of interest (ROI) analyses using the brain regions extracted from the contrast 
between false belief and false photograph statements in the theory of mind localizer. 
Based on the results of our previous fMRI experiment, we were especially interested in the 
following ROIs: the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), 
the right TPJ and the precuneus. Unlike the left TPJ, the right TPJ cluster extracted from the 
theory of mind localizer was part of a large cluster that extended to the right temporal pole. 
We therefore only included the part of this cluster that was posterior to the most anterior 
coordinate of the left TPJ cluster (y = -44) in the right TPJ ROI. Parameter estimates based 
on these ROIs were computed using MarsBar (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) for a 
number of contrasts based on the consistency model (communicative first round > individual 
first round, communicative second round > individual second round, communicative third 
round > individual third round) and the repetition model (communicative first attempt > 
individual first attempt, communicative repetition > individual repetition).
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Results
Behavioral results
We compared the communicative and individual blocks on a number of behavioral measures. 
Based on the coding of the responses we looked at the degree of consistency in responses 
in the second and third rounds and the number of attempts per trial per round of the picture 
description task. In addition, we counted the mean number of words per response and 
calculated the planning durations per trial, i.e. the duration between stimulus onset and 
the director’s button press. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when the sphericity 
assumption was violated and Holm–Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was 
used for all reported post-hoc tests. The results are summarized in Figure 5.2.
Consistency. We ran a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA comparing the percentage of 
consistent responses with block (communicative or individual) and round (second or third 
round) as within-subject factors. Participants produced more consistent responses with every 
round of the task, F(1,29) = 50.07, p < 0.001. We did not find a significant main effect of block 
(F(1,29) = 2.64, p = 0.12), nor a significant block x round interaction (F(1,29) = 1.56, p = 0.22).
Number of attempts. We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with round as within-subject 
factor. We did not include block as a factor, as the number of repetitions in the individual 
blocks was matched to the number of repetitions in the communicative blocks. We found 
a significant main effect of round on the number of attempts per trial, F(2,58) = 158.39, p 
<0.001. Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed significantly more attempts in the first compared to 
the second round (t(29) = 11.97, p < 0.001), and in the second round compared to the third 
round (t(29) = 5.97, p < 0.001).
Number of words. We ran a 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA comparing the percentage of 
consistent responses with block (communicative or individual) and round (first, second or 
third round) as within-subject factors. We did not find significant main effects (block: F(1,29) 
= 2.08, p = 0.16; round: F(2,58) = 1.15, p = 0.33), nor a significant block x round interaction 
(F(2,58) < 1, p = 1).
Planning durations. We ran a 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA comparing the percentage 
of consistent responses with block (communicative or individual) and round (first, second 
or third round) as within-subject factors. We found a significant main effect of block (F(1,29) 
= 14.32, p < 0.001), a main effect of round (F(2,58) = 203.86, p < 0.001) and a significant 
block x round interaction effect (F(2,58) = 9.02, p  < 0.01). Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed 
significantly longer planning durations in the first collaborative round relative to the first 
individual round (t(29) = 4.60, p < 0.001), but no significant differences between the second 
rounds (t(29) = 2.10, p = 0.09) and the third rounds of the block (t(29) = 1.06, p = 0.30).
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Figure 5.2: Behavioral results: A) the percentage of responses that are consistent with previously given 
responses in the second and third rounds of the communicative and individual blocks (first round responses 
are not included, as there were no  responses from previous rounds to compare them to), B) the mean number 
of attempts per trial in the communicative blocks (which were matched in the individual blocks), C) the mean 
number of words per response given, and D) the mean planning duration per response, as measured from trial 
onset until the director’s button press response. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
ROI results
For the ROI analysis, we focused on a subset of the clusters found in the contrast between 
false belief and false photograph statements from the theory of mind localizer: the mPFC, the 
left TPJ, the right TPJ and the precuneus. For the consistency model, we looked at the direct 
comparisons between consistent responses in the communicative and individual blocks per 
round to investigate how the recruitment of mentalizing areas changes as speakers establish 
and reuse conceptual pacts. For the repetition model, we looked at the direct contrasts 
of the first attempts and the repetitions between the communicative and the individual 
blocks. This allowed us to test whether mentalizing areas are especially recruited following a 
misunderstanding in a communicative context. The parameter estimates obtained from the 
ROI analyses are shown in Figure 5.3.
Consistency model. We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with round as within-subject factor 
on the parameter estimates obtained in the regions of interest using the communicative first 
round > individual first round, communicative second round > individual second round and 
communicative third round > individual third round contrasts. We found a significant main 
effect of round in all ROIs (mPFC: F(2,58) = 3.68, p < 0.05; left TPJ: F(2,58) = 5.74, p < 0.01; 
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right TPJ: F(2,58) = 5.06, p <0.01; precuneus: F(2,58) = 6.55, p < 0.01). Planned comparisons 
revealed significant differences between the first and second round (mPFC: t(58) = 2.58, p < 
0.05; left TPJ: t(58) = 3.38, p < 0.01; right TPJ: t(58) = 3.26, p < 0.01; precuneus: t(58) = 3.72, p 
< 0.001). A significant difference between the second and third round was only found in the 
left TPJ (left TPJ: t(58) = 2.42, p < 0.05; mPFC: t(58) = 0.56, p = 0.58; right TPJ: t(58) = 1.74, p = 
0.09; precuneus: t(58) = 1.25, p = 0.22).
Repetition model. We ran paired t-tests to compare the parameter estimates obtained in 
the first attempts and the repetition trials in the regions of interest using the communicative 
first attempt > individual first attempt and communicative repetition > individual repetition 
contrasts. Parameter estimates were significantly higher for the repetition trials in all regions 
except the mPFC (mPFC: t(29) = 0.81, p = 0.43; left TPJ: t(29) = 2.35, p < 0.05, right TPJ: t(29) = 
2.13, p < 0.05; precuneus: t(29) = 2.57, p < 0.05).
Figure 5.3: Results of the region of interest analysis. The top row contains the results of the ROI analysis for 
the direct comparisons per round between the communicative and the individual blocks (consistency model). 
The bottom row contains the results for the direct comparisons between the communicative and individual 
first attempts and repetitions (repetition model). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Whole-brain results
In this study, we aimed to investigate how the neural representation of conceptual pacts 
changes over the course of repeated reference. By comparing the communicative blocks 
to the individual blocks, we could control for the effects of repeated viewing and naming 
of the pictures, thus allowing us to focus on the effect of coordinating meaning with a 
communication partner over rounds. For the whole-brain analysis, we first looked at the 
way the neural representation of conceptual pacts changes over rounds (consistency model). 
We therefore compared consistent responses between the communicative and individual 
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blocks. The results of these comparisons can be found in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.4. Given that 
the effect of communicative context may be maximal following a misunderstanding (i.e., when 
the matcher did not select the correct picture based on the director’s description, and needs to 
describe the picture again), we then compared directors’ first attempts and repeated attempts 
to describe pictures between the communicative and the individual blocks, collapsing over 
rounds (repetition model).  The results of these contrasts are listed in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.5.
Communicative > individual, collapsed over rounds. The direct comparison of the 
communicative and the individual blocks, collapsed over rounds revealed a series of mostly 
right-lateralized clusters including the fusiform gyrus, the inferior parietal lobule and the 
inferior temporal gyrus. 
[Communicative round 1 - communicative round 3] - [individual round 1 - individual 
round 3]. We tested which brain regions showed a larger decrease in activity from the first to the 
third round in the communicative relative to the individual blocks. This directional interaction 
revealed a large cluster that included the bilateral parahippocampal gyri, hippocampi, fusiform 
gyri and lingual gyri. Another large and more anterior bilateral cluster included the thalamus, 
pallidum, putamen and amygdala. The remaining clusters are described in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.4: A) Brain areas showing greater activity in the communicative planning trials compared to the 
individual planning trials, collapsed over rounds (dark blue), B) brain regions showing activity for the directed 
block x round interaction effect (violet) and, C) brain regions showing greater activity for trials in the first 
communicative round relative to the first  individual round (cyan). Below, we show the clusters in the putamen 
as well as in the hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus.
Communicave > individual, collapsed over rounds
[Communicave round 1 - communicave round 3] - [individual round 1 - individual round 3]
First round communicave > first round individual
A) C)
B)
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Communicative > individual per round. The results of the direct comparison between the 
first rounds of the communicative and the individual blocks overlap to a considerable extent 
with the results of the previous contrast. The largest cluster extends from the bilateral insula, 
putamen, amygdala, pallidum, caudate and thalamus more posteriorly to the hippocampus, 
parahippocampal, fusiform and lingual gyri and the precuneus. In contrast, the comparison 
between the second rounds of the communicative and the individual blocks revealed no 
significant clusters, and the comparison of the third rounds only resulted in two cerebellar 
clusters.
Table 5.1: Whole-brain results of the contrasts based on the consistency model.
Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Communicative > individual
right fusiform gyrus 291 5.27 34 -72 -18
right fusiform gyrus 3.74 36 -60 -20
right inferior parietal lobule 97 4.79 26 -52 54
right precuneus 3.71 14 -52 54
right inferior temporal gyrus 90 4.66 52 -44 -10
right inferior temporal gyrus 4.34 50 -44 -18
left fusiform gyrus 50 4.52 -36 -44 -24
right insula 46 4.48 34 20 -6
right middle occipital gyrus 67 4.33 46 -76 24
right middle occipital gyrus 4.27 40 -82 24
right middle occipital gyrus 3.51 32 -80 20
left fusiform gyrus 63 4.17 -34 -72 -16
right inferior parietal lobule 65 3.97 36 -42 50
right inferior parietal lobule 3.78 48 -52 54
[Communicative round 1 - communicative round 3] - [individual round 1 - individual round 3]
left precentral gyrus 1323 6.88 -20 -14 58
left precentral gyrus 5.63 -32 -10 58
left supplementary motor area 5.03 -8 2 52
right parahippocampal gyrus 3488 6.61 22 -42 -8
left lingual gyrus 6.27 -16 -40 -2
left lingual gyrus 5.42 -22 -46 -4
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
[Communicative round 1 - communicative round 3] - [individual round 1 - individual round 3]
left middle temporal gyrus 420 5.85 -46 -62 14
left middle temporal gyrus 4.14 -44 -56 8
left middle temporal gyrus 3.71 -54 -68 22
left amygdala 2658 5.64 -34 0 -22
left thalamus 5.18 -14 -12 -2
right pallidum 5.15 16 6 -2
right inferior temporal gyrus 127 5.4 52 -16 -24
right temporal pole 4.46 48 10 -32
right temporal pole 4.24 36 16 -32
left inferior temporal gyrus 69 5.29 -40 -12 -30
right midcingulate cortex 88 4.82 12 -32 42
left precuneus 284 4.7 -10 -50 44
left precuneus 4.54 -12 -56 56
left midcingulate cortex 4.44 -6 -40 44
left inferior parietal lobule 255 4.63 -30 -40 42
left inferior parietal lobule 4.37 -44 -38 44
left inferior parietal lobule 3.63 -50 -30 44
right postcentral gyrus 199 4.49 36 -30 40
right postcentral gyrus 4.48 46 -26 40
right supramarginal gyrus 3.61 56 -28 38
right supramarginal gyrus 221 4.37 64 -36 26
right supramarginal gyrus 4.17 54 -22 20
right supramarginal gyrus 4.08 48 -30 24
right middle temporal gyrus 88 4.23 46 -58 10
right middle temporal gyrus 3.95 44 -66 22
First round communicative > first round individual
right precuneus 17815 7.51 18 -42 0
left precuneus 7.48 -14 -44 2
left insula 7.39 -34 0 -6
right precentral gyrus 1884 6.11 36 -6 58
right supplementary motor area 5.35 16 -8 56
Table 5.1: Whole-brain results of the contrasts based on the consistency model. (continued)
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
First round communicative > first round individual
right supplementary motor area 5.25 8 -6 54
right middle temporal gyrus 198 5.76 64 -48 -2
right middle temporal gyrus 4.16 56 -46 -8
right middle temporal gyrus 3.86 50 -56 2
left precentral gyrus 1309 5.54 -42 -18 58
left superior frontal gyrus 5.53 -22 -8 58
left inferior parietal lobule 5.36 -50 -30 44
right precentral gyrus 460 5.47 60 10 28
right inferior frontal gyrus 4.34 54 16 10
right inferior frontal gyrus 4.31 52 6 22
left superior frontal gyrus 99 5.01 -10 32 48
left middle frontal gyrus 4.57 -22 30 38
left superior medial frontal gyrus 3.75 -6 34 40
left middle temporal gyrus 564 4.78 -46 -64 8
left middle occipital gyrus 4.54 -46 -80 16
left middle temporal gyrus 4.5 -42 -62 18
right midcingulate cortex 92 4.54 14 16 34
right anterior cingulate cortex 4.2 8 14 28
right anterior cingulate cortex 4.02 12 22 28
right thalamus 62 4.19 10 -26 2
3.71 -2 -30 -2
left inferior frontal gyrus 77 4.11 -48 16 8
left superior temporal gyrus 4.05 -50 8 0
left superior temporal gyrus 3.99 -52 4 -10
Second round communicative > second round individual
no suprathreshold clusters
Third round communicative > third round individual
right cerebellum 90 4.6 48 -70 -32
right cerebellum 3.98 38 -70 -22
left cerebellum 68 4.36 -42 -70 -26
Table 5.1: Whole-brain results of the contrasts based on the consistency model. (continued)
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Communicative first attempt > individual first attempt. We directly compared first 
attempts in the communicative and individual blocks, collapsed over rounds. This contrast 
revealed significant right-lateralized parietal, temporal, occipital and cerebellar clusters.
Communicative repetition > individual first attempt. The direct comparison between 
repetitions in the communicative and individual blocks revealed a relatively deep 
intraparietal cluster, as well as a large cluster including the bilateral lingual, calcarine, 
fusiform and parahippocampal gyri, the hippocampi and the cerebellum. The remaining 
clusters are described in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.5: A) Brain areas showing greater activity for the first attempts in the communicative blocks compared 
to the individual blocks, collapsed over rounds (red), B) brain regions showing greater activity for repeated 
attempts in the communicative blocks compared to the individual blocks, collapsed over rounds (yellow).
Table 5.2: Whole-brain results of the contrasts based on the repetition model.
Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Communicative first attempt > individual first attempt
right inferior temporal gyrus 106 5.32 60 -54 -6
right inferior temporal gyrus 4.85 50 -44 -10
right inferior parietal lobule 49 4.85 26 -52 54
right postcentral gyrus 4.09 24 -42 56
right middle occipital gyrus 109 4.63 44 -78 26
right middle temporal gyrus 3.92 48 -66 14
right middle occipital gyrus 3.9 36 -82 32
Communicave first aempt > individual first aempt
Communicave repeon > individual repeon
A) B)
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Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
Communicative first attempt > individual first attempt
right fusiform gyrus 141 4.54 36 -70 -20
right cerebellum 3.96 28 -72 -20
right cerebellum 3.72 24 -66 -24
Communicative repetition > individual repetition
left intraparietal sulcus 551 5.9 -30 -38 34
left intraparietal sulcus 5.3 -24 -48 34
left intraparietal sulcus 4.88 -34 -50 36
right fusiform gyrus 4235 5.88 28 -54 -10
right lingual gyrus 5.34 22 -58 -4
left lingual gyrus 4.94 -24 -50 -8
right intraparietal sulcus 123 4.89 38 -44 34
right intraparietal sulcus 3.7 44 -38 38
right middle temporal gyrus 79 4.78 46 -34 -4
right middle temporal gyrus 3.68 62 -42 -2
right superior temporal gyrus 3.62 46 -24 -4
right inferior occipital gyrus 118 4.64 46 -78 -4
right middle occipital gyrus 4.11 42 -84 10
right middle occipital gyrus 3.8 38 -88 2
left middle occipital gyrus 152 4.62 -36 -88 14
left middle occipital gyrus 4.28 -50 -76 10
left middle occipital gyrus 3.75 -36 -80 -2
left middle temporal gyrus 164 4.45 -50 -36 -2
left middle temporal gyrus 4.27 -48 -28 -2
81 4.14 -2 -6 -10
left thalamus 3.8 -18 -8 2
left thalamus 3.7 -6 -12 -4
right amygdala 55 4.14 32 2 -12
right putamen 4.06 32 6 -4
left superior parietal lobule 68 3.95 -22 -58 56
left superior parietal lobule 3.85 -28 -48 50
Table 5.2: Whole-brain results of the contrasts based on the repetition model. (continued)
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Theory of mind localizer: false belief > false photograph. The contrast between false 
belief and false photograph statements in the theory of mind localizer revealed an activation 
pattern in line with previous studies (Dodell-Feder et al., 2010; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; van 
Ackeren et al., 2012), including bilateral clusters in the medial prefrontal cortex, temporal 
poles, middle temporal gyri, angular gyri and the precuneus (Figure 5.6, Table 5.3). We used 
the results of this contrast to determine the areas for the ROI analysis.
Figure 5.6: A) Brain areas showing greater activity for the false belief statements relative to the false 
photograph statements (green).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated how the process of coordinating meaning shapes the 
neural representations of conceptual pacts. We were especially interested in how the 
recruitment of brain regions involved in mentalizing changes over the course of repeated 
references. Participants generated labels for abstract figures together with another person 
(communicative blocks) or by themselves (individual blocks). The ROI analysis revealed that 
the mentalizing network was most strongly engaged during the initial stages of establishing 
conceptual pacts and when multiple attempts were needed to describe a figure.in the 
communicative blocks. The whole-brain analysis revealed neural differences in parietal, 
occipital and temporal brain regions between the communicative and the individual blocks. 
Similar to the ROI results, these neural differences were most pronounced during the initial 
stages of establishing conceptual pacts and following misunderstandings between the 
participants in the communicative blocks. 
False belief > false photograph
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Table 5.3: Whole-brain results of comparison between the false belief and false photograph statements from 
the theory of mind localizer.
Brain region
Cluster 
extent 
(voxels)
T value
MNI coordinates
x y z
False belief > false photograph
right temporal pole 4508 12.51 54 10 -32
right middle temporal gyrus 10.44 56 2 -20
right middle temporal gyrus 10.29 54 -8 -18
left angular gyrus 2304 9.85 -44 -64 26
left angular gyrus 9.06 -46 -54 24
left middle occipital gyrus 7.95 -40 -72 32
left middle temporal gyrus 2025 9.7 -60 -16 -16
left temporal pole 9.27 -46 14 -36
left middle temporal gyrus 9 -56 2 -28
right precuneus 3605 9.41 4 -56 32
left precuneus 9.03 -4 -60 22
left precuneus 8.81 -12 -52 36
left superior medial frontal gyrus 4278 8.06 -10 48 36
left superior frontal gyrus 7.93 -12 48 22
right anterior cingulate cortex 6.81 8 54 10
left parahippocampal gyrus 203 6.7 -26 -38 -10
left lingual gyrus 4.63 -22 -46 -6
left lingual gyrus 3.94 -24 -54 -4
left anterior cingulate cortex 141 6.27 -2 10 -10
left thalamus 117 5.64 -4 -24 2
right thalamus 4.74 6 -26 0
right inferior frontal gyrus 248 4.89 46 34 -12
right inferior frontal gyrus 4.54 56 26 8
right inferior frontal gyrus 4.51 46 22 14
left cerebellum 122 4.83 -26 -74 -36
left cerebellum 4.02 -18 -80 -38
left cerebellum 3.63 -16 -70 -32
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The role of mentalizing in the establishment of conceptual pacts
Based on the results of our previous study, we were especially interested in studying how 
neural representations of conceptual pacts change as they are established and whether this 
would lead to increased or decreased engagement of the mentalizing network. The results 
of the ROI analysis revealed interesting changes in the recruitment of mentalizing areas over 
the course of repeated references in the communicative blocks. That is, the mentalizing 
network was recruited most strongly in the first round of the communicative blocks. 
Parameter estimates significantly decreased in the second round. Brains regions involved in 
mentalizing thus appear to play an especially important role during the initial coordination 
process.
We hypothesized that the difference between the communicative and individual blocks 
may be maximal in mentalizing areas following a misunderstanding. If the matcher did not 
accept or understand the director’s initial proposal for a linguistic label, the director received 
feedback from the matcher and tried to describe the same figure again. We hypothesized 
that directors may need to engage in (additional) mentalizing to adjust their initial response 
based on the matcher’s feedback in these situations. In line with this hypothesis, the ROI 
analysis revealed increased activity in the left TPJ, right TPJ and precuneus for the comparison 
between the repetitions and the first attempts, showing that repetitions indeed engage 
brain regions involved in mentalizing more than first attempts. This effect may also drive the 
preferential engagement of mentalizing areas during the first round of the communicative 
task, as this round contained the most attempts (see Figure 5.2B).
Whole-brain results
The whole-brain results show that the neural differences between the communicative and 
individual blocks are most pronounced during the initial stages of establishing conceptual 
pacts. The directed interaction revealed large cortical and subcortical clusters. Interestingly, 
many of these clusters were bilateral. These findings suggest that the neural differences 
between the communicative and the individual blocks were mostly driven by the initial 
coordination process in the communicative blocks. Typically, participants settled on a set of 
linguistic labels during this round and reused these labels in subsequent rounds. Contrary to 
our expectations, the whole-brain results did not reveal activations in the key regions of the 
mentalizing network, with the exception of the right TPJ. 
A closer look at the results of the direct comparison between the first rounds of the 
communicative and individual tasks suggests that at least some of the differences between 
the communicative and individual tasks are related to memory and attention processes. 
The parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus are known to play an important role in the 
binding of pieces of contextual information in episodic memory (Aminoff, Kveraga, & Bar, 
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2013; Gabrieli, 1998;  Squire, 1992), and the inferior parietal cortex supports the attentional 
influence on memory (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008). A possible explanation 
for at least part of the observed differences may thus be that the communicative task more 
strongly engaged areas involved in episodic memory encoding. This could be due to the 
need to encode more relevant context information in the communicative context (e.g., the 
communicative partner). Assuming that the neural differences are due to memory processes, 
it is interesting to note the relative absence of frontal clusters in most of the contrasts. 
The neural differences in structures involved in episodic memory processes suggest that 
establishing conceptual pacts may at least partly engage domain-general episodic memory 
processes, as proposed by Horton & Gerrig (2005). This possibility may seem difficult to 
reconcile with the research showing successful encoding of conceptual pacts in patients 
with hippocampal amnesia, although a later study showed that the patients are impaired 
when tangram figures are highly visually similar (Duff et al., 2012). Future research will have 
to further clarify the link between memory encoding and retrieval in communicative and 
collaborative contexts and investigate the effect of the richness of the interactive context 
and the type of stimuli on these processes.
Comparing encoding and retrieval
It is interesting to compare the results of the current study to the findings of our previous 
experiment (chapter 4). In that study, we found increased activity in the mPFC, the right TPJ, 
and the precuneus during the retrieval of collaboratively as compared to individually learned 
linguistic labels. However, in the current study, the neural representations of collaboratively 
and individually learned labels appear to become more similar over the course of the tasks, 
and the recruitment of brain regions involved in mentalizing decreases over the course of 
repeated references. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the puzzling differences between the 
results of these studies. One possible explanation is that the encoding and retrieval of jointly 
established linguistic labels rely on distinct neural resources, or at least engage regions 
involved in mentalizing to a different extent. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, the 
differences between the studies may be due to differences in the experimental set-up. While 
our previous study allowed for relatively free-flowing interaction during the behavioral 
session, the current experiment greatly restricted participants’ interactive means. Although 
the current paradigm allowed for bidirectional communication, the simplified feedback and 
lack of partner-specific signals (e.g., voice) may have reduced the partner-specificity of the 
representations associated with the linguistic labels. 
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Conclusion
In this study, we investigated how the process of coordinating meaning shapes the neural 
representations of conceptual pacts. Brain regions involved in mentalizing appear to be most 
strongly recruited during the initial stages of establishing conceptual pacts and following 
misunderstandings in a communicative context. The whole-brain results revealed neural 
differences in parietal, occipital and temporal brain regions between the communicative and 
the individual task. Similar to the ROI results, these neural differences were most pronounced 
during the initial stages of establishing linguistic labels, and following misunderstandings 
between the participants in the communicative task. In addition, we found evidence that 
the establishment of conceptual pacts at least partly relies on domain-general episodic 
memory processes.
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General discussion
In this thesis, I have investigated how the communicative context in which we speak affects 
the cognitive and neural processes underlying language production. I focused especially 
on how speakers take into account and establish common ground to achieve mutual 
understanding. The experiments described in the second and third chapters focused on 
the way in which speakers take moment-by-moment changes in common ground into 
account. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I investigated how speakers build up common 
ground over the course of a series of interactions by establishing conceptual pacts. In this 
discussion chapter, I will first summarize the main findings of these experiments, followed by 
a discussion of the implications of these findings for psycholinguistic theories and possible 
avenues for future research. 
Summary of the findings
In chapter two, I used eye-tracking to investigate when and how common and privileged 
ground information affect utterance planning. Participants played a computerized version 
of a referential communication game in which a director described objects in an array 
for a matcher. We manipulated common ground by occluding certain objects from the 
matcher’s point of view. On critical trials, the director had to adjust their description based 
on this perspective difference to unambiguously describe the target objects to the matcher. 
Speakers mainly, but not always, produced referring expressions that took into account 
their addressee’s visual perspective. Eye-tracking data revealed that speakers distinguished 
between common and privileged ground from the earliest stages of utterance planning, but 
did not completely ignore objects in privileged ground. Finally, we did not find evidence that 
taking common ground into account requires additional planning time.
In chapter three, I adapted the paradigm from the second chapter to study the neural 
processes that allow us to take moment-to-moment changes in common ground into 
account by means of fMRI. In addition to comparing situations in which the distinction 
between common and privileged ground information was relevant to utterance planning, 
I directly compared communicative and non-communicative planning. I found that the 
medial prefrontal cortex, a core region of the mentalizing network, is especially sensitive 
to communicative contexts in which speakers have to take their addressee’s needs into 
account in order to communicate efficiently. In addition, I found neural differences between 
the communicative and the non-communicative settings before speakers started to plan 
their utterances, suggesting that they continuously keep track and update common ground 
in a communicative context.
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The fourth chapter looked at how jointly establishing and learning linguistic labels in a 
communicative context affects the memory networks involved during the retrieval of the 
labels. In this experiment, participants learned labels for abstract figures in three conditions: 
they generated labels in a communication game with another participant, they came up 
with labels by themselves, and they learned a set of unrelated labels. Participants then 
retrieved all labels in the MRI scanner during a communication task. We found that the 
retrieval of collaboratively generated labels as compared to individually learned labels 
engages brain regions involved in mentalizing, including the medial prefrontal cortex, the 
right temporoparietal junction and the precuneus. These findings show that the process 
of establishing linguistic labels in a communicative context can affect the neural networks 
involved in the retrieval of these labels.
In chapter five, I investigated how the process of coordinating meaning shapes the neural 
representations of jointly established linguistic labels (conceptual pacts). Participants in this 
fMRI experiment repeatedly described abstract figures in either a communicative context 
or an individual context. We found that mentalizing areas are most strongly engaged 
during the initial stages of establishing conceptual pacts with a communication partner 
and following misunderstandings between participants in the communicative context. In 
addition to the neural differences in mentalizing areas, brain regions involved in episodic 
memory encoding were more strongly engaged in the initial stages of establishing linguistic 
labels in the communicative task as compared to the individual task.
The role of common ground in speech planning
The second and third chapters focused on how and when the distinction between common 
and privileged ground affects language production. Behaviorally, we did not find a significant 
main effect of condition on planning duration in either of these studies. Null findings are 
hard to interpret, especially given the modest sample sizes in these studies, but these results 
do suggest that taking another person’s visual perspective into account in a communicative 
context can be a relatively fast and efficient process. The results of the fMRI study in chapter 
three suggest that speakers’ fast adaptation to their addressee is achieved as a result of the 
recruitment of additional neural resources when speakers need to take common ground 
into account during utterance planning. Brain regions involved in mentalizing and cognitive 
control play an important role in this process. 
The eye-tracking results from the second chapter showed that speakers distinguish between 
common and privileged ground from the earliest stages of utterance planning. Despite this 
early distinction, these data also showed that speakers could not fully ignore privileged 
ground information. Combined, these findings suggest that common ground exerts an 
early, if incomplete effect on utterance planning. A similar picture emerged from the 
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speakers’ responses. While speakers mainly produced referring expressions that took into 
account their addressee’s visual perspective, they occasionally failed to do so. This did not 
only happen when they risked being overinformative, but even when the addressee would 
not be able to infer the intended referent. These findings fit well with Constraint-Based 
Processing models that predict an early and probabilistic influence of common ground on 
language processing (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003; Horton 
& Gerrig, 2002; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995). In this view, common ground is one of multiple 
constraints (e.g., saliency, linguistic context) that can guide language processing. 
Common ground, mentalizing and memory
In the fourth and fifth chapters, I turned my attention to the effects of communication 
on memory representations. Using fMRI, I found that the retrieval of conceptual pacts as 
compared to individually generated labels recruits brain regions involved in mentalizing. 
These findings show that the process of grounding referring expressions with someone else 
can lead to at least partly neurally distinguishable representations at retrieval. In a follow-
up experiment, I aimed to clarify the role of mentalizing in the encoding and retrieval of 
conceptual pacts by investigating how the process of coordinating meaning shapes the 
neural representations of jointly established linguistic labels. The results of this study 
showed that brain regions involved in mentalizing are most strongly recruited during the 
initial stages of establishing conceptual pacts and following feedback from the addressee. 
Most differences between the communicative and the individual contexts disappeared over 
the course of repeated references. 
What do these findings tell us about the memory representations of conceptual pacts? 
The results of chapters four and five point to the involvement of the mentalizing network 
in both the encoding and retrieval of conceptual pacts. The decreasing involvement if 
brain regions involved in mentalizing in chapter five was unexpected based on the results 
of chapter four. One possible explanation is that the free-flowing, interactive nature of the 
encoding task used in chapter four resulted in richer and stronger partner-specific memory 
traces than the simplified communication paradigm used in chapter five. This possibility 
raises interesting questions and methodological considerations for future research on the 
effects of communication and collaboration on memory. A major challenge will be to create 
naturalistic and multimodal communicative contexts in the lab.
The results of chapter five also showed that episodic memory processes appear to play a 
role in the encoding and retrieval of conceptual pacts. We found increased activity in the 
hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus during the initial stages of creating linguistic 
labels in a communicative as compared to an individual context. This fits well with Horton 
& Gerrig’s proposal (2005) that conversation partners create rich episodic memory traces of 
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their interactions, thus linking interlocutors and conceptual pacts in memory. The presence 
of a conversational partner can then serve as a cue that reactivates overlapping information 
in memory, such as previously established conceptual pacts. Future research will further 
have to clarify the contribution of mentalizing and episodic memory processes and their 
interplay in the encoding and retrieval of conceptual pacts.
Implications for the neurobiology of language
This thesis illustrates that research on the neurobiology of language should not ignore the 
social and communicative context in which language is used. The results show that the 
communicative context in which we speak influences the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying language production. Neurobiological theories of language processing should 
therefore account for the role of social and communicative factors. This will require additional 
multidisciplinary research that links the neurobiology of language to fields such as social 
cognition, memory, action and attention, as well as to the behavioral psycholinguistic 
literature on this topic. In addition, this approach will require the development of novel 
paradigms and methods to study language processing in interactive settings (see the 
section on avenues for future research below).
The results described in this thesis do not point to one specific brain region or network that 
is systematically recruited when we use language to communicate with others. While brain 
regions involved in mentalizing and theory of mind appear to play an important role, I also 
found neural differences in areas involved in cognitive control, visual attention and episodic 
memory. These results suggest that communicative language processing may be highly 
dependent on the interaction between the classical language network and other cognitive 
systems. The precise interactions between these systems probably depend on the task or 
situation at hand. Future research will further have to elucidate under what conditions and 
how these systems interact. 
Avenues for future research
The research described in this thesis raises a number of questions for further research. Below 
I highlight some interesting avenues for future research related to the generalizability of 
the findings, the role of individual differences, and developmental changes in children’s 
sensitivity to common ground in language processing.
One important question is to what extent the findings described in the previous chapters 
generalize to more realistic conversational settings. The paradigms I have used in my 
experiments all featured relatively simple two-person communicative interactions. In real-
life settings, conversations often involve more than two conversational partners, which may 
make keeping track of the common ground shared with all partners considerably more 
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complicated. Similarly, the referential communication task used in the second and third 
chapters made the perspective difference between speakers and listeners visually salient. 
Taking common ground into account in this situation may therefore involve relatively low-
level visual-perspective taking. However, in real-life conversations, speakers sometimes have 
to infer what their interlocutor believes or feels in addition to what they can see, which may 
require different perspective-taking processes. 
A major challenge for future studies on communicative language processing will be to 
develop more naturalistic paradigms that tap into the complexity and multimodal nature 
of real-life interactions. Virtual reality appears to be an especially promising method in this 
respect, as it offers the possibility to develop experimental paradigms that are rich, controlled 
and compatible with neuroimaging. In addition, simultaneously measuring neural activity in 
several interacting participants (i.e. hyperscanning) may provide interesting new insights in 
how mutual understanding emerges. For example, one could study how and where brain-
to-brain coupling increases as interlocutors establish conceptual pacts or build up common 
ground over the course of repeated interactions. Such novel methods will allow us to test 
whether current findings extend to more realistic and complex environments, and may 
capture additional factors that can influence communicative language processing.
The research described in this thesis points to an important role for the theory of mind or 
mentalizing network in communicative language production, but future research will have 
to further specify the exact contribution of this network. Many authors have argued that the 
brain regions that make up the mentalizing network subserve particular sub-processes of 
mentalizing (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Yet, 
the exact function of these different sub-regions remains a hotly debated issue in the social 
cognition literature. For example, while some have argued that the right temporoparietal 
junction selectively subserves the attribution of beliefs to other people (e.g., Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006), others have proposed that this region plays a more 
general role in reorienting attention (e.g., Mitchell, 2008). The experiments described in this 
thesis were not designed to tease apart the functions of the sub-regions of the mentalizing 
network, but my results shed at least some light on their role. For example, in chapter 3 I 
found that the medial prefrontal cortex is especially sensitive to communicative contexts in 
which speakers have to take their addressee’s needs into account in order to communicate 
efficiently. New developments in the social cognition literature will undoubtedly lead to new 
hypotheses about the role of the sub-regions of the mentalizing network in communicative 
language production.
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The results reported in this thesis also suggest that a number of other domain-general 
cognitive functions, including attention, control and episodic memory processes contribute 
to speakers’ ability to consider and establish common ground. One approach to further 
specify the contributions of such domain-general cognitive functions is to study individual 
differences. So far, studies of individual differences using referential communication tasks 
have found effects of mentalizing (Sidera, Perpiñà, Serrano, & Rostan, 2016), inhibitory 
control (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen, Varghese, Xu, & Fecica, 2015; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; 
Wardlow, 2013) and working memory abilities (Nilsen et al., 2015; Wardlow, 2013).
Another promising approach is to study the development of children’s sensitivity to common 
ground. Given the relatively slow development of children’s theory of mind skills during 
the preschool years, studying their sensitivity to common ground at different ages can 
provide interesting insights into the role and nature of perspective-taking in this process. 
The visual perspective-taking skills needed to infer which objects a person with a different 
visual perspective can or cannot see develop by 24 months (Masangkay et al., 1974; Moll 
& Tomasello, 2006). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that 5- to 6-year-olds are sensitive 
to the distinction between common and privileged ground information in both language 
production and comprehension, as tested using a simple paradigm similar to the task used 
in chapters two and three (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). It remains to be seen whether younger 
children show similar sensitivity. Perhaps more interestingly, four- and six-year-old children 
can establish conceptual pacts with their peers (Köymen, Schmerse, Lieven, & Tomasello, 
2014), and even three-year-old children do not expect their conversation partner to break a 
jointly established conceptual pact (Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2010). Given that children 
only begin to pass false belief tasks around the age of four (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), 
these findings suggest that high-level mental reasoning may not be a precondition for the 
emergence of partner-specific effects. 
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have investigated the role of common ground in communicative language 
production by combining existing psycholinguistic paradigms with eye-tracking and fMRI. 
The results of the experiments show that communicative factors such as common ground 
can affect both online linguistic planning (chapters 2 and 3), as well as the encoding and 
retrieval of jointly established linguistic labels over the course of communicative interactions 
(chapters 4 and 5). These findings suggest that a complete theory of the neurobiology of 
language needs to account for social and communicative influences on language processing.
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&
Nederlandse samenvatting
Communicatie en common ground
Je gebruikt taal in de eerste plaats om met anderen te communiceren. Of je nu roddelt, een 
drankje bestelt of lesgeeft, meestal spreek je met iemand en niet tegen jezelf. Het feit dat je 
taal gebruikt om te communiceren heeft gevolgen voor de manier waarop je je uitdrukt. Als 
je met je driejarige neefje spreekt, gebruik je waarschijnlijk simpelere woorden dan wanneer 
je met een collega overlegt. Of beeld je in dat je een verdwaalde vriend aan de telefoon moet 
uitleggen hoe hij je huis kan vinden. Om duidelijke aanwijzingen te kunnen geven, is het 
handig om je in zijn schoenen te verplaatsen. Uit deze voorbeelden blijkt dat je taalgebruik 
wordt beïnvloed door de communicatieve context waarin je spreekt.
Hoe zorgt je brein ervoor dat je je taalgebruik schijnbaar moeiteloos kunt aanpassen aan 
je gesprekspartner? Er is hierover nog vrij weinig geweten, omdat psycholinguïstisch 
onderzoek doorgaans geen rekening houdt met communicatieve en sociale invloeden op 
taalgebruik. In dit proefschrift heb ik daarom onderzocht hoe de communicatieve context 
waarin je spreekt van invloed is op de manier waarop je spreekt en de onderliggende 
hersenprocessen. 
De rode draad in dit proefschrift is het concept common ground, letterlijk te vertalen 
als “gedeelde grond”. Common ground verwijst naar de overtuigingen en kennis die 
gesprekspartners delen. Deze gedeelde informatie speelt een belangrijke rol in conversaties. 
Stel je voor dat ik tegen je zeg: “Ik zag Jan gisteren bij de Albert Heijn.” Jij begrijpt dan alleen 
wie ik gisteren heb gezien als we allebei weten wie Jan is en we van elkaar weten dat we Jan 
kennen. In dit geval maak ik gebruik van onze common ground (“wij kennen allebei Jan”) om 
een duidelijke zin te formuleren. 
Common ground kan je ook opbouwen tijdens een conversatie. Misschien hebben wij 
bijvoorbeeld meerdere vrienden die Jan heten en verloopt de conversatie als volgt:  
- “Ik zag Jan gisteren bij de Albert Heijn.” 
- “Jan van de Franse les?”  
- “Nee, Jan van Sofie” 
- “Hoe gaat het met hem?”
Met enkele zinnen hebben we samen bepaald welke Jan we bedoelen en een afspraak 
gemaakt over hoe we naar hem kunnen verwijzen. We kunnen het daardoor tijdens de rest 
van ons gesprek over “Jan van Sofie” hebben zonder dat dit tot verwarring leidt. Met dit 
soort afspraak, ook een conceptueel pact genoemd, zorgen we ervoor dat de verwijzing 
“Jan van Sofie” deel uitmaakt van onze common ground. 
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In dit proefschrift rapporteer ik de resultaten van vier experimenten waarin ik heb onderzocht 
hoe common ground ons taalgebruik en de onderliggende hersenprocessen beïnvloedt. In 
hoofdstukken twee en drie heb ik vooral gekeken naar wanneer en hoe common ground 
taalproductie beïnvloedt. In hoofdstukken vier en vijf heb ik de relatie tussen communicatie 
en geheugen onderzocht, waarbij ik heb bestudeerd hoe je conceptuele pacten opbouwt 
en onthoudt. 
Common ground en taalproductie
In hoofdstuk twee heb ik onderzocht wanneer en hoe je tijdens het spreken rekening houdt 
met welke informatie je deelt met je gesprekspartner (common ground) en welke informatie 
je niet deelt (privileged ground). Er bestaan twee theorieën over wanneer en hoe mensen 
rekening houden met common ground terwijl ze plannen wat ze willen zeggen. Volgens de 
ene theorie houden mensen tijdens het plannen al vroeg rekening met welke informatie ze 
delen met hun gesprekspartner. Volgens de andere theorie plannen mensen wat ze willen 
zeggen aanvankelijk vanuit hun eigen perspectief en passen dit pas later aan als blijkt dat 
dit nodig is.
Ik heb een interactieve taak ontwikkeld om te testen of sprekers vroeg of laat rekening 
houden met common ground. Aan dit experiment namen telkens twee proefpersonen deel, 
een spreker en een luisteraar. De spreker en de luisteraar zagen tegenovergestelde zijden 
van een kast die was ingedeeld in vakjes met objecten. Sommige vakjes met objecten 
waren open aan beide zijden en dus zichtbaar voor spreker en luisteraar; andere vakjes met 
objecten waren maar aan één zijde open en dus enkel zichtbaar voor de spreker of voor de 
luisteraar. Door vakjes te openen of te sluiten kon ik manipuleren welke objecten zichtbaar 
waren voor beide proefpersonen (gedeelde informatie of common ground) en welke 
objecten alleen zichtbaar waren voor een van de proefpersonen (niet-gedeelde informatie 
of privileged ground).
De spreker kreeg telkens de opdracht om een van de objecten in de kast te beschrijven voor 
de luisteraar. De luisteraar probeerde dan op dit object te klikken. Soms zag de spreker extra 
objecten die de luisteraar niet kon zien en moest de spreker hiermee rekening houden om 
efficiënt met de luisteraar te communiceren. Als je in de kast in figuur A.1 bijvoorbeeld het 
middelgrote glas (aangeduid met de rode cirkel) beschrijft voor iemand die aan de andere 
kant van de kast zit, moet je er rekening mee houden dat deze persoon het kleinste glas 
(hier aangeduid met het groene vierkant) niet kan zien. Als je rekening houdt met wat de 
ander kan zien, zou je het glas omschrijven als “het kleine glas”. Als je dat niet doet, zou je het 
omschrijven als “het middelgrote glas”, en weet de andere persoon niet welk glas je bedoelt. 
Hij of zij ziet namelijk slechts twee glazen. 
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Figuur A.1: Voorbeeld van de objecten die de proefpersonen in de taken uit hoofdstukken 2 en 3 beschreven.
Op basis van de omschrijvingen van de sprekers kon ik vaststellen of sprekers rekening 
hielden met welke objecten hun gesprekspartner kon zien: zeiden ze “het kleine glas” of “het 
middelgrote glas”? Ik vond dat sprekers in hun antwoorden meestal rekening hielden met 
wat de luisteraars konden zien. Om te onderzoeken wanneer sprekers bij het plannen van 
hun omschrijvingen rekening hielden met common ground, heb ik ook hun oogbewegingen 
gemeten met een eye-tracker. Zodoende kon ik precies meten hoe lang en wanneer de 
sprekers naar objecten keken die zichtbaar of onzichtbaar waren voor de luisteraar. Hieruit 
bleek dat sprekers al vroeg tijdens het plannen van wat ze willen zeggen minder kijken 
naar objecten die niet zichtbaar zijn voor de luisteraars. De resultaten van dit experiment 
bevestigen dus de eerste hypothese dat sprekers tijdens het plannen al vroeg rekening 
houden met common ground.
In hoofdstuk drie heb ik onderzocht welke hersengebieden actief zijn wanneer je rekening 
houdt met common ground. Uit eerder onderzoek is gebleken dat extra hersengebieden 
actief worden wanneer mensen iets beschrijven met als doel om met iemand anders te 
communiceren dan wanneer ze niet het doel hebben om te communiceren. De bijkomende 
hersengebieden die daarbij actief zijn, zijn ook actief wanneer je je mentaal in de schoenen 
van iemand anders probeert te verplaatsen. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval wanneer je 
moet begrijpen dat iemand anders een situatie anders interpreteert dan jij omdat ze over 
andere informatie beschikken. De hersengebieden die actief worden wanneer je je mentaal 
in de schoenen van een ander probeert te verplaatsen (de mediale frontale cortex, de 
temporoparietale juncties en de precuneus) worden samen ook het mentalizing network 
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genoemd. In dit experiment wilde ik testen of het mentalizing network vooral actief is 
wanneer je rekening moet houden met common ground.
Ook aan dit experiment deden telkens twee proefpersonen mee. De ene proefpersoon 
lag in de MRI-scanner en de andere zat aan een computer buiten het MRI-lab. Tijdens het 
experiment voerde de proefpersoon in de MRI-scanner afwisselend een communicatieve 
taak met de andere proefpersoon en een taak alleen uit. De communicatieve taak met de 
andere proefpersoon was gebaseerd op de taak uit hoofdstuk 2: de proefpersoon in de 
MRI-scanner beschreef objecten in een kast met open en gesloten vakjes en de andere 
proefpersoon probeerde op basis van deze beschrijvingen op de objecten te klikken. Soms 
moest de proefpersoon in de scanner daarvoor rekening houden met common ground (bijv. 
wanneer hij/zij middelgrote glas in figuur A.1 moet beschrijven) en soms niet (bijv. als hij/
zij de kleine vaas moet beschrijven). De individuele taak leek sterk op de communicatieve 
taak, behalve dat de proefpersoon buiten de MRI-scanner niet meedeed. De proefpersoon 
in de scanner moest in deze taak dus geen rekening houden met welke objecten zichtbaar 
waren voor de andere proefpersoon. Tijdens beide taken heb ik door middel van fMRI de 
hersenactiviteit van de proefpersonen in de MRI-scanner gemeten.
Met deze opzet kon ik twee interessante vergelijkingen onderzoeken: de vergelijking 
tussen taalproductie in een communicatieve en een niet-communicatieve context, en de 
vergelijking binnen de communicatieve taak tussen communicatieve situaties waarin je 
rekening moet houden met common ground en situaties waarin dat niet nodig is. Voor de 
vergelijking tussen spreken in een communicatieve en een niet-communicatieve context 
vond ik, in tegenstelling tot vorige studies, slechts een klein neuraal verschil. Ik vond 
echter grote verschillen toen ik binnen de communicatieve taak vergeleek welke gebieden 
actief zijn voor de vergelijking tussen communicatieve situaties waarin je rekening moet 
houden met common ground en situaties waarin dat niet nodig is. Op het moment dat je 
rekening moet houden met wat je gesprekspartner kan zien, wordt een groot deel van het 
mentalizing network actief. Mijn resultaten zorgen dus voor een interessante aanvulling 
op eerder onderzoek. Vorige studies hebben gevonden dat het mentalizing network meer 
actief is wanneer je het doel hebt te communiceren met iemand anders dan wanneer je dat 
doel niet hebt. Mijn resultaten laten echter zien dat dit netwerk niet altijd even actief is in 
communicatieve situaties: het is voornamelijk actief wanneer je rekening moet houden met 
je gesprekspartner om efficiënt te communiceren. 
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Common ground en geheugen
In het vierde en vijfde hoofdstuk heb ik de invloed van communicatie op het geheugen 
onderzocht. Ik heb bestudeerd hoe mensen conceptuele pacten opbouwen en onthouden, 
en hoe conceptuele pacten verschillen van beschrijvingen die je op je eentje leert. In 
hoofdstuk vier heb ik onderzocht of beschrijvingen die je met een ander hebt bedacht op 
een andere manier worden opgeslagen in je hersenen dan beschrijvingen die je alleen hebt 
bedacht. De aanleiding voor dit experiment was een studie over patiënten met amnesie. De 
onderzochte patiënten konden amper nieuwe verbanden leren als gevolg van hersenletsel 
in de hippocampus, het belangrijkste geheugencentrum in het brein. Opmerkelijk genoeg 
bleek dat deze patiënten in staat waren om in een communicatieve taak met een andere 
proefpersoon nieuwe beschrijvingen voor plaatjes te leren. Deze resultaten suggereren dat 
leren in een communicatieve context mogelijk deels via andere hersenprocessen verloopt 
dan leren in een niet-communicatieve, individuele context. Deze hypothese heb ik in het 
volgende experiment getest. 
Aan dit experiment deden telkens twee proefpersonen mee en het experiment bestond 
uit twee delen. Tijdens het eerste deel leerde een van de proefpersonen in drie taken 
beschrijvingen voor abstracte plaatjes: een communicatieve taak, een individuele taak 
en een arbitraire taak. Figuur A.2 bevat een paar voorbeelden van deze plaatjes. In de 
communicatieve taak beschreef de proefpersoon plaatjes op een scherm zodat de andere 
proefpersoon op de beschreven plaatjes kon klikken. De proefpersonen konden hierbij 
vragen stellen en aanwijzingen geven aan elkaar, en bouwden zo samen beschrijvingen of 
conceptuele pacten voor de plaatjes op. In de individuele taak bedacht de proefpersoon op 
zijn/haar eentje beschrijvingen voor een nieuwe set plaatjes. In de arbitraire taak, ten slotte, 
kreeg dezelfde proefpersoon een derde set abstracte plaatjes te zien met ongerelateerde 
beschrijvingen die hij/zij van buiten moest leren. Tijdens het tweede deel van het experiment 
lag deze proefpersoon in de MRI-scanner en kon ik zijn/haar hersenactiviteit meten. De 
proefpersoon kreeg alle plaatjes uit het eerste deel van het experiment opnieuw te zien 
en produceerde hardop de beschrijvingen die hij/zij hiervoor had geleerd. Ondertussen 
probeerde de andere proefpersoon op basis van deze beschrijvingen op de beschreven 
plaatjes te klikken.
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Figuur A.2: Voorbeelden van de plaatjes waarvoor de proefpersonen in de experimenten uit hoofdstukken 4 
en 5 beschrijvingen leerden.
Ik wilde met dit experiment onderzoeken of beschrijvingen die proefpersonen met iemand 
anders hebben bedacht in een communicatieve context anders worden opgeslagen in de 
hersenen dan beschrijvingen die ze alleen hebben bedacht. De gedragsdata lieten een 
interessant patroon zien: de omschrijvingen die proefpersonen samen hadden bedacht 
waren gemiddeld het langste, maar toch konden proefpersonen zich tijdens de taak in de 
MRI-scanner deze beschrijvingen het snelste en beste herinneren. Met de fMRI-resultaten 
kon ik onderzoeken welke hersengebieden actief waren terwijl proefpersonen zich de 
beschrijvingen probeerden te herinneren in de scanner. Ik was vooral geïnteresseerd in de 
vergelijking tussen het ophalen van beschrijvingen die proefpersonen met iemand anders 
hadden bedacht en beschrijvingen die ze zelf hadden bedacht. Ik vond dat het mentalizing 
network (de mediale frontale cortex, de temporoparietale juncties en de precuneus) meer 
actief was wanneer proefpersonen de samen bedachte beschrijvingen ophaalden dan 
wanneer ze de alleen bedachte beschrijvingen ophaalden. Dit is de eerste studie die aantoont 
dat het samen bedenken van beschrijvingen een blijvend effect heeft op de processen die 
betrokken zijn bij het later ophalen van de beschrijvingen uit je geheugen.
In hoofdstuk 5 heb ik onderzocht hoe de neurale verschillen tussen samen en alleen bedachte 
beschrijvingen uit hoofdstuk 4 ontstaan. In dit experiment liet ik proefpersonen in de MRI-
scanner beschrijvingen voor abstracte plaatjes bedenken in een communicatieve of een niet-
communicatieve taak. Deze taken leken sterk op de communicatieve en de individuele taken 
uit hoofdstuk 4. In de communicatieve taak probeerde de proefpersoon in de MRI-scanner 
de plaatjes te beschrijven voor een proefpersoon buiten de scanner. De proefpersoon buiten 
de scanner probeerde op basis van deze beschrijvingen op het juiste plaatje te klikken. 
Als de beschrijving van de proefpersoon in de scanner niet helemaal duidelijk was, kon de 
proefpersoon buiten de scanner feedback geven aan de andere proefpersoon. Op deze 
manier bedachten de proefpersonen samen beschrijvingen voor de plaatjes. In de individuele 
taak bedacht de proefpersoon in de scanner individueel beschrijvingen voor een andere set 
plaatjes. In beide taken beschreef deze proefpersoon alle plaatjes meermaals.
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Ik wilde met dit experiment onderzoeken hoe de neurale verschillen tussen samen en alleen 
bedachte beschrijvingen ontstaan en wanneer deze verschillen het grootst zijn. Is dat het 
geval wanneer je voor het eerst een beschrijving voor een plaatje bedenkt of pas na enkele 
herhalingen? Ik was hierbij vooral geïnteresseerd in verschillen binnen het mentalizing 
network, omdat ik daar grote verschillen vond in hoofdstuk 4. Binnen het mentalizing network 
bleek het verschil tussen het samen en alleen bedenken van beschrijvingen het grootst op 
het moment dat proefpersonen voor het eerst een beschrijving voor een plaatje bedachten 
of wanneer ze net feedback hadden kregen van hun gesprekspartner. Waarschijnlijk is dit 
het geval omdat ze vooral dan rekening houden met hun gesprekspartner om het plaatje zo 
duidelijk mogelijk te beschrijven. 
Conclusie
In dit proefschrift heb ik de rol van common ground in taalproductie onderzocht door middel 
van eye-tracking en fMRI. Ik vond onder andere dat common ground een vroege invloed 
heeft terwijl je plant wat je wilt zeggen en dat extra hersengebieden binnen het mentalizing 
network actief zijn wanneer je rekening houdt met common ground. Deze resultaten maken 
duidelijk dat een complete theorie over de neurobiologie van taal ook rekening moet 
houden met communicatieve en sociale factoren.
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Ik wil graag mijn nieuwe collega’s in Utrecht bedanken. Brigitte, Hetty, Judith, Martijn en 
Quirijn, bedankt voor het warme welkom bij het RSO! Ik voel me al helemaal thuis onder de 
Domtoren 
Ik wil ook graag Paul Berendsen en mijn MaGW-collega’s bedanken voor de mogelijkheid 
om een half jaar van het werken buiten de wetenschap te proeven. Dankzij mijn NWO-tijd 
kon ik met hernieuwde motivatie en energie dit proefschrift afmaken. Ik hoop dat jullie het 
PNN-project zeker verder zetten!
Gelukkig kon ik ook buiten het Donders rekenen op geweldige vrienden. Annemieke, Dieter, 
Lieneke, Marjolein, Hein, Anne, Jenny en John, bedankt om deze PhD-periode van veel wijn, 
kikkers, kaasplanken, negerzoenen en ander leuks/lekkers te voorzien. Jullie waren een 
fantastisch support team op weg naar de finishlijn! Nele, Antoine, Sarah en Frederik, bedankt 
voor de gezellige bezoekjes in Brussel, Gent en Nijmegen. Tom, we begonnen samen aan dit 
avontuur in Nijmegen en ik hoop dat we ondanks de afstand contact blijven houden.
Jessica, Fred, Amanda, Birgit, Julia, oma Atsje en oma Rietje, bedankt voor het warme welkom 
in jullie familie. Ik ben blij dat ik nog mocht terugkomen nadat jullie bij mijn eerste bezoek 
al meteen vijf vriendinnen op de koffie kregen. Het is erg fijn om een Nederlands home away 
from home te hebben in Flevoland. 
Ik wil ook graag mijn tantes, nonkels en de hele familie Raeymaekers bedanken voor het 
organiseren van de jaarlijkse zomerkerst, zodat ik mijn Belgische roots niet vergeet. Een 
familiefeest is uiteraard niet compleet zonder een varken/geit aan het spit of een gigantische 
pan paella!
Lieve mama en papa, jullie hebben me altijd door dik en dun gesteund. Bedankt voor de 
wekelijkse Skypegesprekken, jullie vele bezoekjes aan Nijmegen en de leuke kerstvakanties. 
Papa, met een vader die zijn vrije tijd besteedt aan onderzoek naar mossen is het misschien 
niet verwonderlijk dat ik wetenschapper ben geworden. Het deed veel deugd om te 
kunnen praten met een PhD-ervaringsdeskundige en ik heb erg genoten van onze mooie 
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fietstochten door Nederland. Mama, bedankt dat je me hebt laten opgroeien in een huis vol 
boeken, kunst en cultuur. Van jou heb ik geleerd om buiten de gebaande paden te denken, 
altijd met een kritische blik naar de wereld te kijken en zo veel mogelijk op eigen benen te 
staan. 
Lieve Ruben, waar moet ik beginnen? Ik ben zo blij dat we elkaar hebben ontmoet en ik 
kan je niet genoeg bedanken voor je steun en geduld. Je stond altijd voor me klaar met een 
luisterend oor, een peptalk of een portie advies. Samen vierden we onze eerste publicaties 
en nieuwe banen, en samen worden we dit jaar doctor. Ik ben benieuwd waar ons pad heen 
zal leiden, maar heb er alle vertrouwen in dat het een mooie reis wordt met jou. 
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Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young scientists. 
To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour established 
the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience (DGCN), which was officially 
recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. The Graduate School covers training at 
both Master’s and PhD level and provides an excellent educational context fully aligned with 
the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students in 
biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and related 
disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment of the 
best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni show 
a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, e.g. Stanford 
University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, MPI Leipzig, Hanyang 
University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, North Western University, 
Northeastern University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of Vienna etc.. Positions outside 
academia spread among the following sectors: specialists in a medical environment, mainly 
in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. Specialists in a psychological environment, 
e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, psychological diagnostics or therapy. Positions in 
higher education as coordinators or lecturers. A smaller percentage enters business as 
research consultants, analysts or head of research and development. Fewer graduates  stay in 
a research environment as lab coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming 
possibilities are positions in the IT sector and management position in pharmaceutical 
industry. In general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with high-quality 
positions that play an important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit:
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/
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